Journals / All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace / 2017 / Cilt: 6 - Sayı: 1

The Politics of Effective Aid and Interstate Conflict

Etkili Yardım Politikası ve Devletlerarası Çatışma

Pages
83–102
Publication Date
2017-01-01
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Moreover, democratic states are not significantly more peaceful to each other than non-democratic pairs once we take into account the amount of foreign aid they receive.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:The link between foreign aid and military conflict has received little attention in both aid effectiveness and interstate conflict research.
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Key Findings & Data:Foreign aid, on the one hand, increases citizen welfare in democratic regimes; hence, also governments’ ex-ante re-election prospects.
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Conclusion & Impact:Moreover, democratic states are not significantly more peaceful to each other than non-democratic pairs once we take into account the amount of foreign aid they receive.
🔬Design:Research Article
📍Scope:2001 Verileri
⚙️Variables:demokrasi · dış yardım etkili · seçem maliyetleri

Abstract

The link between foreign aid and military conflict has received little attention in both aid effectiveness and interstate conflict research. This study provides a first-cut analysis of the impact of foreign aid on interstate conflict among recipient countries. In doing so, it opens the black box of state and builds on the previous research in the aid effectiveness literature and on the signaling processes in the conflict literature. Previous research indicates that the effectiveness of aid in improving citizen welfare is conditional on the presence of democratic institutions. This study shows that this conditional relationship has a detrimental effect on crisis bargaining outcomes. Foreign aid, on the one hand, increases citizen welfare in democratic regimes; hence, also governments’ ex-ante re-election prospects. On the other hand, foreign aid retards government ability to generate audience costs and to send informative signals to their opponents. Analyzing all dyads from 1961 to 2001 yields robust support for this view. As aid inflows increase, targets’ resistance propensity against threats issued by democratic governments becomes statistically indistinguishable from threats issued by autocratic governments. Moreover, democratic states are not significantly more peaceful to each other than non-democratic pairs once we take into account the amount of foreign aid they receive.

Özet

Dış yardım ve askeri çatışma arasındaki bağlantı, hem yardımların etkinliği hem de devletlerarası çatışma araştırmalarında pek az ilgi görmüştür. Bu çalışma, yardım alan devletler arasındaki devletlerarası çatışmalara dış yardımın etkisinin bir analizini sunmaktadır. Bunu yaparken, devletin kara kutusunu açarak yardım etkinliği literatüründeki önceki araştırmaları ve çatışma literatüründeki uyarma sürecini esas almaktadır. Önceki araştırmalar, yardımların vatandaşların refah düzeyini yükseltmeye yönelik etkinliğinin demokratik kurumların varlığına bağlı olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu makale, bu koşullu ilişkinin kriz görüşmeleri üzerinde negatif bir etkisi olduğunu göstermektedir. Dış yardımlar, demokratik rejimlerde bir yandan vatandaşların refah düzeyini arttırırken bir yandan da hükümetlerin yeniden seçilme şanslarını artırmaktadır. Öte yandan, dış yardımlar, seçmenin geri çekilme durumunda hükümete vereceği cezaları azaltmakta ve hükümetin rakiplerine bu cezalardan kaçınma eğiliminin fazlalığına dayanarak göndereceği mesajların gücünü azaltmaktadır. 1961’den 2001’e kadarki tüm ikililerin incelenmesi, bu görüşü desteklemektedir. Yardım girdileri arttıkça, demokratik hükümetlerin tehditlerine karşı gösterilen direnç eğilimi, otokrat hükümetler tarafından yapılan tehditlerden istatistiksel olarak ayırt edilemez hale gelmektedir. Dahası, aldıkları dış yardımları dikkate alırsak, demokratik devletlerin, demokratik olmayan devletlerarası ilişkilere kıyasla birbirlerine karşı daha fazla barış eğilimi içinde olmadıkları görülmektedir.

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Cite This Article

Orsun, O. F. (2017). The Politics of Effective Aid and Interstate Conflict. All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Cilt: 6 - Sayı: 1, 83–102. https://ajindex.com/articles/119812

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