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Journals / All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace / 2020 / Cilt: 9 - Sayı: 1

Ideas and Interests: European Democracy Aid and the Democracy-Security Dilemma, 1990-2010

James M. Scott
Brandy Jolliff Scott
Pages
61–81
Publication Date
2019-12-20
DOI
—
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the impact and explanation of EU democracy promotion policies.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:Since the end of the Cold War, advanced democracies have enacted explicit strategies of democracy promotion by providing assistance to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations all over the world.
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Key Findings & Data:This paper examines the factors shaping European Union democracy aid allocation decisions from 1990-2010, weighing the relative impact of ideational concerns (regime type, human rights) and self-interests (political, security, economic).
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Conclusion & Impact:The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the impact and explanation of EU democracy promotion policies.
🔬Design:Modeling & Simulation
📍Scope:2010 Verileri
⚙️Variables:democracy aid · foreign policy · European Union

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, advanced democracies have enacted explicit strategies of democracy promotion by providing assistance to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations all over the world. This paper examines the factors shaping European Union democracy aid allocation decisions from 1990-2010, weighing the relative impact of ideational concerns (regime type, human rights) and self-interests (political, security, economic). We argue that EU democracy aid reflects a “democracy-security dilemma” as the EU balances ideational reasons for promoting democracy with concerns over political and economic relationships, regional stability, and security. We test our hypotheses with a series of random effects, generalized least squares and Heckman selection models, which provide support for our argument. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the impact and explanation of EU democracy promotion policies.

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Cite This Article

Scott, J. M., Scott, B. J. (2019). Ideas and Interests: European Democracy Aid and the Democracy-Security Dilemma, 1990-2010. All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Cilt: 9 - Sayı: 1, 61–81. https://ajindex.com/articles/119771

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