Journals / FLSF Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi / 2026 / Sayı: 43

WHAT DOES NEW ESSENTIALISM OFFER US? AN ASSESSMENT OF KRIPKE-PUTNAM ESSENTIALISM

YENİ ÖZCÜLÜK BİZE NE SAĞLAR? KRİPKE-PUTNAM ÖZCÜLÜĞÜNE DAİR BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

Pages
307–325
Publication Date
2026-05-11
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

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⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

In this respect, it can be said that new essentialism attempts to reestablish, at the level of language and based on the semantics of possible worlds, an understanding of essence that will assume the function of the focus imaginarius that Kant attributed to his ideas of reason.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

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Objective & Hypothesis:The view that entities have certain essential and unchanging properties that determine what they are is known as essentialism.
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Key Findings & Data:Yet by the 1970s, essentialism had returned to focus, particularly through the work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, which drew on modal logic and semantics.
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Conclusion & Impact:In this respect, it can be said that new essentialism attempts to reestablish, at the level of language and based on the semantics of possible worlds, an understanding of essence that will assume the function of the focus imaginarius that Kant attributed to his ideas of reason.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:Comprehensive Sample
⚙️Variables:özcülük · zorunlu a posteriori · modal mantık

Abstract

The view that entities have certain essential and unchanging properties that determine what they are is known as essentialism. However, with the development of mechanical physics and Darwinian evolutionary theory essentialism has been largely abandoned. Yet by the 1970s, essentialism had returned to focus, particularly through the work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, which drew on modal logic and semantics. New essentialist studies began to emerge based on their work. Kripke's causal theory of reference asserts that the reference of proper names is fixed in every possible world by rigid designators, and hence claims that there are necessary a posteriori propositions. Arguing that this idea can be extended to certain generic names, Kripke maintains that theoretical identity statements are also necessary, not contingent. The basis of Kripke and Putnam's arguments rests on a modal logic law known as the necessity of identity, which states that if a true identity statement is established, it is necessary. In this respect, new essentialism is purely formal in nature and does not say anything about how observable qualities relate to essence. Nevertheless, new essentialism establishes a focus for the continuation of scientific activity by placing at its core the idea of an essence that can be discovered through experience. In this respect, it can be said that new essentialism attempts to reestablish, at the level of language and based on the semantics of possible worlds, an understanding of essence that will assume the function of the focus imaginarius that Kant attributed to his ideas of reason.

Özet

Varlıkların ne olduklarını belirleyen, sahip olmaları zorunlu, içsel ve değişmez birtakım özellikleri olduğu görüşü olan özcülük olarak ifade edilir. Özcülük ve ona yaslanan bilimsel anlayış bir taraftan mekanik fiziğin gelişimi, diğer taraftan Darwin’ci evrim kuramı ile büyük ölçüde terk edilmiştir. 1970’li yıllara gelindiğinde ise özellikle Saul Kripke ve Hilary Putnam’ın modal mantık ve semantikten hareket eden çalışmaları ile özcülük yeniden gündeme gelmiş, onların fikirlerinden hareketle yeni özcü çalışmalar yapılmaya başlanmıştır. Kripke’nin nedensel gönderim kuramı özel adların gönderiminin katı göstericiler ile her mümkün dünyada sabitlendiğini söyleyerek zorunlu a posteriori önermeler olduğunu iddia eder. Bu fikrin birtakım cins adlara da genişletilebileceğini savunan Kripke bu yolla kuramsal özdeşlik ifadelerinin de olumsal değil zorunlu olduğunu savunur. Kripke ve Putnam’ın argümanlarının esası özdeşliğin zorunluluğu olarak ifade edilen bir modal mantık yasasına dayanır ki bu yasa, eğer doğru bir özdeşlik ifadesi kurulmuş ise bunun zorunlu olduğunu söyler. Bu bakımdan yeni özcülük özün tesisi ile ilgili bir şey söylememekte salt biçimsel bir mahiyet taşımaktadır. Bu salt biçimsel özcülük gözlemlenebilir nitelikler ile özün nasıl ilişkilendiğini açıklamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bununla birlikte yeni özcülük bilimsel faaliyetin hedefine deneyimle keşfedilebilecek zorunlu bir öz fikrini koyarak bilimsel faaliyetin sürdürülmesi için bir odak belirlemiş olmaktadır. Bu bakımdan denilebilir ki yeni özcülük Kant’ın akıl idelerine yüklemiş olduğu muhayyel odak -focus imaginarius- işlevini üstlenecek bir öz anlayışını mümkün dünyalar semantiğinden hareketle dil düzeyinde yeniden tesis etmeye çalışmaktadır.

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Cite This Article

Çalık, K. K. (2026). WHAT DOES NEW ESSENTIALISM OFFER US? AN ASSESSMENT OF KRIPKE-PUTNAM ESSENTIALISM. FLSF Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Sayı: 43, 307–325. https://doi.org/10.53844/flsf.1837001

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