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Journals / Ekonomi Politika ve Finans Araştırmaları Dergisi / 2026 / Cilt: 8 Sayı: 1

Delisting as an Indicator of Development in Stock Exchanges: A Schumpeterian Perspective

Borsalarda Gelişimin Göstergesi Olarak İşleme Kapanma: Schumpeteryan Bir Bakış Açısı

Yasin Erdem Çevik(ANKARA HACI BAYRAM VELİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0003-3684-6668
Furkan Emirmahmutoglu(ANKARA HACI BAYRAM VELİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ)0000-0001-7358-3567
Pages
20–39
Publication Date
2023-03-31
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AI Summary & Key Takeaways

AI Insight
⚡ TL;DR(Too Long; Didn't Read)

Findings support that creative destruction is also important for the development of stock markets.

📌 3 Key Takeaways

🎯
Objective & Hypothesis:The basis of this study is the Schumpeterian perspective.
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Key Findings & Data:The research period of the study is 2006-2016.
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Conclusion & Impact:Findings support that creative destruction is also important for the development of stock markets.
🔬Design:Araştırma Makalesi
📍Scope:2006-2016 Verileri
⚙️Variables:İşlem Sırası Kapanma · Gönüllü İşleme Kapanma · Zorunlu İşleme Kapanma

Abstract

The basis of this study is the Schumpeterian perspective. In this study, the concept of delisting is considered as an 'indicator of development' within the scope of the Schumpeterian view. In the study, which argues that the creative destruction of companies is the basis of innovative economies, the effect of legal differences between countries and financial development on the delisting in stock markets has been investigated. Testing this relationship is important in terms of better understanding the companies that are delisted and the resources transferred from these companies to other businesses. The research period of the study is 2006-2016. While the results of the analysis, which included 45 exchanges, clearly reveal the effect of legal differences between countries on the delisting; it is seen that there are more delisting in large and liquid exchanges. When the subject is analyzed in terms of developed and developing countries, the general quality of legal regulations and practices in developing countries and financial development are important in delisting. For developed countries, details such as the protection of small investors and the country's having a more innovative economy gain importance. Findings support that creative destruction is also important for the development of stock markets.

Özet

Bu çalışmanın temelini, Schumpeteryan görüş oluşturmaktadır. Bu çalışmada işleme kapanma kavramı Schumpeteryan görüş kapsamında ‘gelişmişliğin bir göstergesi’ olarak ele alınmıştır. Yenilikçi ekonomilerin temelinde şirketlerin yaratıcı yıkımının bulunduğunu savunan çalışmada, ülkeler arasındaki hukuki farklılığın ve finansal gelişmişliğin borsalarda yaşanan işleme kapanmalar üzerine olan etkisi araştırılmıştır. Bu ilişkinin test edilerek ortaya konulması, işlem sırası kapanan şirketler ile bu şirketlerden diğer işletmelere aktarılan kaynakların iyi kavranması açısından önemlidir. Araştırma dönemi 2006-2016 yıllarıdır. 45 borsanın dahil edildiği analiz sonuçları, ülkeler arasındaki hukuki farklılığın işleme kapanmaya olan etkisini belirgin bir şekilde ortaya koyarken; büyük ve likit borsalarda daha fazla işleme kapanma yaşandığı görülmektedir. Konu, gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülke ayrımında incelendiğinde, gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki hukuki düzenleme ve uygulamaların genel kalitesi ve finansal gelişmişlik, işleme kapanma açısından önem arz ederken; gelişmiş ülkeler için küçük yatırımcının korunması, ülkenin daha yenilikçi bir ekonomiye sahip olması gibi detaylar önem kazanmaktadır. Çalışmadan elde edilen bulgular, yaratıcı yıkımın, borsaların gelişimi açısından da önemli olduğunu destekler nitelik taşımaktadır.

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Cite This Article

Çevik, Y. E., Emirmahmutoglu, F. (2023). Delisting as an Indicator of Development in Stock Exchanges: A Schumpeterian Perspective. Ekonomi Politika ve Finans Araştırmaları Dergisi, Cilt: 8 Sayı: 1, 20–39. https://doi.org/10.30784/epfad.1100716

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