An Application of Expected Utility Modeling and Game Theory in IR: Assessment of International Bargaining on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Abstract

This article provides an introduction to the theoretical underpinnings of expectedutility and game theory approaches in IR studies. It goes on to explore theirapplication to a specific research subject, international bargaining on Iran’snuclear program. In this application, the article presents forecasts about Iran’snuclear program using a game theoretic, bounded rationality model called theexpected utility model (Bueno de Mesquita 2002). Three analyses were made inDecember 2005, September 2006 and March 2007. All three forecasts appear tobe in line with real-life developments regarding the issue. The results show thatIran has been losing international support since the analyses started, and the lastforecast suggests a pro-US position supported by all major international actors.Also, all three analyses suggest that Russian and Chinese support is vital to curbthe Iranian nuclear program.