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Journals / Türkiye Mesleki ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi / 2025 / Cilt: 8

IS ACCREDITATION A PREFERENCE SIGNAL? THE IMPACT OF ACCREDITATION ON STUDENT PREFERENCE INDICATORS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE PROGRAMS IN TÜRKIYE

AKREDİTASYON BİR TERCİH SİNYALİ Mİ?: TÜRKİYE’DE SOSYAL BİLİMLER PROGRAMLARINDA AKREDİTASYONUN ÖĞRENCİ TERCİH GÖSTERGELERİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

Umut Can Öztürk

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Publication Date
2026-05-07
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Abstract

This study examines the impact of the visibility of STAR accreditation information in university preference guides as of 2023 on student preference indicators in social sciences programs, employing a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) framework. The analysis is conducted using a balanced panel dataset covering the period 2020–2025 and estimated through a Two-Way Fixed Effects (TWFE) model. The findings indicate that, following the visibility of accreditation status, accredited programs are associated with an approximately 17.6% improvement in entrance rank performance, an average increase of 10 points in placement scores, and a relative improvement of about 2.7 percentage points in percentile rankings. Although statistical significance remains limited, the directional consistency across alternative outcome measures suggests that accreditation visibility generates an economically meaningful quality signal in student preference behavior. In the context of higher education, accreditation functions not only as a quality assurance instrument but also as a mechanism of organizational legitimacy and strategic positioning. The results demonstrate that the external visibility of accreditation reduces information asymmetry and operates as a complementary signal in applicants’ decision-making processes. Overall, accreditation can be interpreted as a strategic governance tool that shapes not only internal performance outcomes but also institutional reputation and market perception.

Özet

Bu çalışma, STAR akreditasyon bilgisinin 2023 yılı itibarıyla tercih kılavuzlarında görünür hâle gelmesinin sosyal bilimler programlarının öğrenci tercih göstergeleri üzerindeki etkisini farkların farkı (Difference-in-Differences, DiD) yaklaşımıyla incelemektedir. Analiz, 2020–2025 dönemini kapsayan dengeli panel veri seti üzerinden iki yönlü sabit etkiler (TWFE) modeli kullanılarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bulgular, akreditasyon görünürlüğü sonrasında akredite programların başarı sıralarında yaklaşık %17,6 oranında iyileşme ile ilişkilendiğini; yerleştirme puanında ortalama 10 puanlık artış ve yüzdelik dilimde yaklaşık 2,7 puanlık göreli yükselme sergilediğini göstermektedir. Katsayıların istatistiksel anlamlılığı sınırlı olmakla birlikte, farklı ölçüm düzeylerinde yönsel tutarlılığın korunması akreditasyonun tercih davranışı üzerinde ekonomik olarak anlamlı bir kalite sinyali ürettiğine işaret etmektedir Yükseköğretim bağlamında akreditasyon yalnızca bir kalite güvencesi aracı değil, aynı zamanda örgütsel meşruiyet ve stratejik konumlanma mekanizmasıdır. Bulgular, akreditasyonun dışsal görünürlüğünün bilgi asimetrisini azaltarak aday karar süreçlerinde tamamlayıcı bir sinyal işlevi gördüğünü göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak akreditasyon, kalite yönetimi sistemlerinin yalnızca içsel performans boyutunu değil, aynı zamanda kurumsal itibar ve piyasa algısı üzerindeki etkilerini de şekillendiren stratejik bir yönetişim aracıdır.

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Cite This Article

Öztürk, U. C. (2026). IS ACCREDITATION A PREFERENCE SIGNAL? THE IMPACT OF ACCREDITATION ON STUDENT PREFERENCE INDICATORS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE PROGRAMS IN TÜRKIYE. Türkiye Mesleki ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 8. https://doi.org/10.46236/jovosst.1899097

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