

İKİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞINDA TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI: TARAFSIZLIK, DİPLOMASİ VE DEVLET YÖNETİMİ TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR: NEUTRALITY, DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT

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Öz

Bu makalenin amacı İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'nin nasıl ve niçin tarafsız kaldığı konusunu yeniden değerlendirmektir. Oldukça açıktır ki ne ekonomisi ne de askeri kapasitesi, Türkiye'nin böyle bir savaşa girmesi için müsaitti. Ancak bu süreçte diplomasinin ve devlet idaresi konusunun oynadığı rol hiç de küçümsememelidir. Gerçekten de dönemin -zaman zaman her iki rolü de oynayan- diplomatlarının ve siyasal liderlerinin tarihsel deneyimleri, onların bu savaşa girmemelerinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Buna rağmen, bugün bazıları hala İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Müttefikler davet ettiğinde savaşa girmiş olsaydı Türkiye'nin birtakım avantajlar sağlanmış olacağını iddia etmektedir. Oysa bu araştırma açıkça göstermektedir ki bu iddialar, ekonomik ve askeri gerekçelerin yanında, ne zaman, nasıl ve hangi tarafta Türkiye savaşta yer almalıydı sorularına bir cevap verilmeden basit birer iddia olmanın ötesine geçemezler. Öte yandan, hiç şüphe yok ki kiminle müttefik olduğuna bakmaksızın, Türkiye bu savaşta yer almış olsaydı, baştan ayağa yıkılmış bir ülkeye dönüşmenin yanında, kesinlikle milyonlarca insanını da kaybetmiş olacaktı. Eğer bunun böyle olmamış olması bir başarı ise, bu başarı tarihsel deneyimlerine yaslanarak ve esnek politikalar takip ederek diplomasi ve devlet idaresi görevlerini yerine getiren dönemin liderlerine ait olmalıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Dış Politika, Tarafsızlık, Diplomasi ve Devlet İdaresi

Abstract

The aim of this article is to revisit the questions of how and why Turkey stayed neutral during the Second World War. It was obvious that neither its economy nor its military capacity was enough powerful to afford such a big war for a long time. However, the role of diplomacy and statecraft cannot be ignored in this process, too. Indeed, Turkish decision-makers as political leaders and diplomats who experienced devastating effects of many wars were not in favor of entering into any war. Although some may think or argue that if Turkey had entered the war on the side of the Allies when they began to pressure for it, it could gain a lot of advantages after the war. However, as this research article has also demonstrated, such arguments are completely groundless for three significant reasons: When, how and in which side should Turkey join the war while the policies of warring parties and the winning side of the war appeared to change from time to time until towards the end of 1944? At that time none wanted Turkey to participate actively in the war on their side. On the other hand, there is no doubt that if Turkey fought in the war, this would cost many more million lives in

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Turkey, in addition to a ruined country from top to down. If there was a success in this war, they mostly belonged to the leaders who played both of the roles of diplomacy and statecraft according to their abilities, connections, experiences and flexible preferences in order to keep Turkey out of the war.

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Keywords

Foreign Policy, Neutrality, Diplomacy and Statecraft.



INTRODUCTION

One of the most interesting features of Turkish foreign policy (TFP) during World War II (WWII) is Ankara's successful use of diplomacy. From a realistic perspective, there was in fact little room for any country like Turkey to act otherwise to be able to ensure its own security, and even more its survival. When the war started in 1939, Turkey was still a young republic struggling with serious domestic and international problems. On the one hand, Turkey embarked upon huge reformation and development programs. On the other, the international climate was heating up with the rise of nationalist movements and revisionist powers in the World.

In the 1930s, anticipated the break-up of a war, Turkey had focused on the containment of any conflict in its security zone by regional pacts. During the same period, however, Turkey did not ignore developments concerning revisionist powers as well. While Ankara was keeping an eye with the actions of the Fascist Italy in the Mediterranean and Balkan regions, it tried not to give any hostile impression on the Nazi Germany. Instead, one of the most important countries with which Turkey carried out trade was Germany, as chromium was Turkey's main export item which was a vital element for the German war industry, too.

On the other hand, the Turkish decision-makers also established peaceful relations with other powers, including France and Britain. Although this process of rapprochement was carefully designated, it was not without problems before and during WWII. For instance, Turkey's international engagements and active foreign policy waltzing more with Britain in the 1930s irritated the Soviet Union. Nor did Moscow approve Turkey's attempts to create a pact together with Britain and France towards the end of the 1930s. However, whilst trying to strengthen friendship with the Western countries, Turkey also made some efforts to satisfy Russians.

Turkish foreign policy may be analyzed from many perspectives within the above-mentioned context. However, the aim of this article has to revisit the questions of why Turkey preferred neutrality in foreign affairs and how it remained neutral until the last hour of the war. Despite growing interests in research on Turkish foreign policy during WWII, as we have used and referenced most of them in this article, some of the aspects of it concerning diplomacy, leadership and statecraft that have considerable impacts on shaping foreign policy between 1939 and 1945 and kept Turkey staying outside of the devastating effects of the most destructive war of humanity still need to be analyzed in details. Therefore, this article attempts to focus on diplomatic maneuvers, material and psychological reasons behind negotiations and relations with warring parties, and leadership that conducted foreign policy during this period. Perhaps diplomacy and statecraft are distinct institutions as well as different fields of study, but they are certainly indispensable to each other and cannot be entirely separated from each other in practice. "Diplomacy focuses on carrying out the specific actions that are needed to improve a nation's relationships with foreign governments. Statecraft is concerned with working at macro scales to plan how a state's government can interact with foreign governments over extended periods of time" (Norwich University, 2018). However, they are still interrelated and, as far as Turkey is concerned during the war, Turkish leaders played roles in both of the fields to keep Turkey outside of the war.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR AND TURKEY'S NEUTRALITY

Towards the beginning of WWII, the Soviet Union and Germany suddenly signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression on 23 August 1939. One week later, Germany attacked Poland. They all realized that Turkey did not expect such a move, mainly because Turkey regarded Italy as

the most important threat for its security and the Turks expected the start of a great war but in the Mediterranean region. However, the Soviet-German treaty also alarmed Ankara since the Turks thought that such a treaty would eventually affect Turkey. Then, Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu visited Moscow and informed Russian authorities about the process of tripartite negotiations with France and Britain and proposed establishing a similar agreement with the Soviet Union. However, the Soviets turned down Saraçoğlu's proposals and repeated their traditional position as to the revision of the Montreux Convention and a military base in the Straits, in a humiliating way towards the Turkish delegation (Çalış 2017: 24-27).

Instead of solving problems, this visit therefore disappointed both the sides (Aydemir 2, 1979: 123; Burçak 1946: 69; Ataöv 1965: 59-60). On the other hand, Turkey signed the Tripartite Agreement with Britain and France on 17 October 1939, on the next day of the visit ended. But, the Soviets preferred to continue accusing Turkey. The new Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, said in a declaration that 'whether or not Turkey would be afraid of it, we will see one day in the future.' He was certainly wrong, however, because Turkey did not only inform the Soviets about the negotiations of the Tripartite Agreement but also insisted on putting an escape clause in the agreement favoring Russia. According to the agreement, Turkey could not be forced 'to take action having as its effect, or involving as its consequence, entry into armed conflict with the USSR'. Citing this clause, Turkey declared its neutrality at the very beginning of the war and managed to be so until the last days of it without any direct conflict with any party of the war including the Soviets in particular (Çalış 1999: 77-79; 2017: 24-25; Deringil 1989: 103-105).

In the meantime, as we have already noted, Germany attacked Poland on 1 September 1939. As a reaction to the invasion, France and Britain declared war on Germany while the Soviets preferred remaining neutral as Turkey did it. This picture would change within a short time when the Germans also started invading the Soviet Union, but Turkey was still able to stay away from the war, mainly thanks to the Tripartite Agreement. It was indeed no surprise since the design of the Tripartite Agreement, its neutrality clause in particular, clearly shows that the leaders of Turkey had already been determined to stay outside of the war. Certainly, they did not know anything about how to maintain such a policy since none in the world was able to predict the course of shape the war would take. Therefore, during the war, Turkish foreign policy fluctuated from time to time in order to keep a balance between the warring parties to be able to sustain neutrality. That is simply because the Turks did not change their strategical position essentially but had to make adjustments in accordance with the course of the war. During the war, Ankara always abstained from any strong commitment regarding to any party. When such seemed to be a necessary action and when Turkey was required to incline towards any power, the Turkish diplomacy did it with a great care in order not to provoke anyone and also not to create any great risk for its security (Vanderlippe 2001: 63-80; Weber 1985; Özden 2013: 91-110). It does not mean that this policy would cost nothing for Turkey, instead, Turkey would also pay its part during the war but neutrality, diplomacy and statecraft would save many million lives.

GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND WALTZES WITH ANKARA

In order to understand this point clearly, it is now appropriate to have a closer look at relations with Germany while Berlin was pressing hard on Ankara for being an ally of Germany. Perhaps there were some circles in Turkey who had sympathy on Nazi Germany, however, the Turks in power who experienced devastating effects of many wars including the First World War were not any more in favor of going to any war with or without anybody. In fact, the leadership or the statecraft of Turkey consisted of mostly warriors, but they were neither utopians nor irredentists seeking adventure anymore in any wars. When Germany attacked Poland, they felt

certainly uncomfortable with what was going on in Europe. Although the attack of the Red Army on Finland led them to worry much about it and its consequences, they regarded it first and foremost as another sign of old Russian imperialist policies (Çalış 1999: 79; Kirk 1956:352).

It was very soon understood that they were not totally wrong since the Soviet leadership did not hesitate in making negotiations with the Germans on the partition of Turkey. For instance, Adolf Hitler, in one of his conversations with Molotov, explicitly brought the case of Turkey to the table and said that Germany was not interested in the Straits and Eastern Europe. However, Molotov who referred to the Crimean War did not conceal their intentions about the future of the Straits and the Black Sea in particular (Deringil 1989: 95-96, 116; DGFP XI 1961: 509-510, 714-715; Esmer 1954: 88-90). As for the Turks, they suspected of something was about to happen in Berlin, but they did not know about any detail of the negotiations. On the contrary, Turkey enjoyed a sort of rapprochement with both of the countries at the beginning of the same year since both of them declared their friendship towards Turkey. Even more, the Germans signed a treaty of friendship with Turkey, only four days before they attacked the Soviets in August 1941 (TCBD 1982: 72-121; Kirk 1952: 450).

German Efforts for Turkey's Entry into the War

The first reaction of Saraçoğlu to Operation Barbarossa -the code name for the German invasion of the Soviet Union- was to call it "a war of new crusaders" who fought each other. Whilst immediately reiterating its neutrality, Turkey appeared to feel at ease, if not pleased, by such a German campaign, because this attack provided Turkey an opportunity to take a deep breath at least for a while (Aydemir 2, 1979: 165; Deringil 1988: 123). Although they refrained from making any enthusiastic official statements that would possibly annoy the Soviets, no doubt that some leaders in Turkey did not hesitate in showing sympathy for a German victory. As far as understood from the dispatches of German Ambassador in Ankara, Franz von Papen, some Turkish statesmen conveyed a sense of enthusiasm but behind closed doors, such as Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Numan Menemencioğlu and Fevzi Çakmak (DGFP XIII, 1964: 174-175, 589-632).

However, as we now know it today, Turkey did not enter into the war when Berlin insisted on Ankara to side with Germany. No doubt that von Papen made a lot of efforts with all means at his disposal until the last hour of his job, but he was not able to convince the Turks to join in the war on their side. His job in Ankara between 1939 and 1944 was not an accidental event since Berlin's expectation from him must have been very high, as he was known not only for his abilities for intrigues but also his experiences with the Turks during the First World War. In addition, his service as the chief of staff for the Ottoman Army 4th division in the Palestine Front must have made him indispensable to the Nazis for a new ambassador in Turkey. Indeed, he attempted many times to fulfill for what he had been appointed. Not only diplomacy, but he also employed all means of intelligence activities and espionages, if not sabotages. When he felt absolutely desperate in persuading Turkey, he did not hesitate in reporting the situation and asking for help from Berlin. For example, when İnönü appeared to be ignorant for von Papen's proposals to side with Germany just before they attacked the Soviet Union, Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, began insulting and threatening Turkey that it will be destroyed within a week if the Turks did not ally with the Germans as soon as possible. (Leitz 2000: 89-92).

However, Turkey in return preferred acting wisely and taking a cool approach concerning von Ribbentrop's rude remarks. No doubt that in a period when the Nazis felt themselves unchallengeable and therefore invaded many countries with blitzkriegs, İnönü's choice for pro-German neutrality was also dictated by the conditions of the war, in addition, his personality and

ideas about war, as we will discuss it in details at the end of this analysis. Therefore, İnönü simply ignored von Ribbentrop's threats, because, at the beginning of 1941, Ankara was well aware of the German threat at their borders and increasingly worried about the possibility of an attack on Turkey, too. Indeed, Germany had already begun invading the Balkan countries including Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia. For Turkey, there was no more option but to take a cool approach and follow a fine-tuned diplomacy in order not to provoke any attack from the Nazis on Turkey (Oran 2001: 434-442).

Material and Ideational Reasons for German Connections

The Turks might have many other reasons, but the first and the most important one was related to its military power that dictated them to stay away from any confrontation with Germany. As we will see in the following pages, Turkey was then perceived by all the warring parties as a country with huge military power. However, the warrior, the Turkish diplomats and leadership knew that the reality of their army told another story. When the war started, the army had not yet realized its modernization and even had not enough military ammunition to wage any war for a long time. It is true that Turkey had a waste standing army, but with antiquated weapons that could not resist effectively against any aircraft attacks (Kalyon 2010: 122-127; Millman 1996: 38-55).

Secondly, its economy was also not sufficiently powerful enough to afford the cost of a big war. Just as Turkey did not have a modern military power, so was its economy. Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the Turks made remarkable progress in economy as well, but it was still based on agriculture essentially. Turkey certainly needed much more time in order to create a modern country with a strong industrial infrastructure. Not surprisingly, its foreign trade consisted of mainly agricultural products and raw materials in export and industrial products in import. There were indeed few industrial establishments centered around İstanbul, İzmir, and Ankara only. Its foreign trade also concentrated on a few items. One of the most important customers among a few countries for traditional Turkish products and the best supplier for Turkish needs in military materials, capital equipment, and medium-priced consumption goods was Germany. Britain was well aware of this fact and occasionally attempted to replace Germany, but the Germans tactfully countered any attempt of Britain through investing more money with better conditions in trade in order to keep Turkey on their side. Started in the 1930s, Turkey made several bilateral credit agreements, in addition to trade agreements, with both of these countries in order to particularly purchase military equipment, too (Weisband 1973: 88-115; Kalyon 2010: 98-131).

Table 1: *Main Economic Indicator of Turkey, 1939-1946*

Years	Population ¹	GDP (1000 \$) ²	Import ³ (1000 \$)	Export ⁴ (1000 \$)	Military Expenditures ⁵ (Million \$)
1939	16 158 018	3 143 855	92 498	99 647	125
1940	17 820 950	3 662 218	50 035	80 904	147.3
1941	-	4 559 679	55 349	91 056	222.3
1942	-	9 440 860	112 879	126 115	234.3
1943	-	14 066 211	155 340	196 734	231.1
1944	-	10 185 037	126 230	177 952	367
1945	18 790 174	8 333 739	96 969	168 264	149.5
1946	-	7 264 498	118 889	214 580	-

(Sources:^{1, 2, 3, 4} Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, "İstatistik Göstergeler: 1923-2009", ⁵ Kalyon 2010: 104)

Nonetheless, during the war, Turkish trade with Germany became a controversial subject in its relations with the Allies since Turkey's export then consisted of strategic materials such as cotton, olive oil, dried fruits, copper, and chrome mainly (Merdlicott 1956, 84-86). The last item was of great importance and Turkey was one of the biggest producers in the world. Chromium was heavily used in the war industry and none was able to produce steel without using it. According to an article which was published in 1942, "chromium is to modern industry as yeast is to bread, but without it there is no bread" (Kempt 1942: 199). Therefore, chromium would become a headache for Turkey under the pressures coming from both sides of the war (Weisband 1973: 101-114). From the Allied point of view, the Turkish trade with Axis powers, the chrome export, in particular, should be stopped without any delay. However, Turkey did export it to Britain as well at the same time for purchasing arms in return. For the Turkish authorities, it was, therefore, simply a part of business as a substantial and vital item in Turkish foreign trade (Merdlicott, 1956: 84-86). According to a recent research, Turkey used the chromium as a bargaining chip to get modern arms from suppliers and there was indeed a direct correlation "between the increase in the German arms exports to Turkey and the Turkish chrome exports to Germany. In other words, Turkey's chrome export to Germany was dependent on the ability of Germany to support Turkey with military materials" (Önsoy 2009: 124).

Table 2: *Chrome and Arms Deal with Germany*

Year	Chrome Exports to Germany	Arms Imports from Germany (Millions RM)
1937	56.385	14.6
1938	68.463	11.7
1939	108.576	0
1940	6	0.08
1941	1.2	0.5
1942	-	136
1943	46.783	8.4
1944	72.000	Not known

(Source: Önsoy 2009: 124)

Interestingly enough, Britain, in particular had good knowledge about this subject, too, and even some of the British diplomats appreciated Turkey's position. For instance, according to British Ambassador in Ankara between 1939-1944, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, "if Turkey's natural political orientation was towards Great Britain, there were inescapable facts which had compelled to look to Central Europe [particularly Germany] for close commercial relations" (Knatchbull-Hugessen, 1949: 145). Physical approximation and historically strong economic ties with Germany, which went back to the Ottoman period and further developed in the 1930s, did not leave for Turkey much room to change its trade policies within the conditions of war (Weisband, 1973: 98-99).

On the other hand, it was no secret that the German attack apparently pleased many in Turkey, as we have indicated in the previous pages, because of the worst scenario, the German-Russian alliance, which became a nightmare for the Turks since 1939, was seemed to be eliminated, at least for a while, thanks to Operation Barbarossa. Even more, the Turks hoped a prompt defeat of Russia in the East, since such would make possible peace between Germany and Britain in the West. In this respect, when Turkey also signed a treaty of friendship with Germany in 1941, it was not seen by the Turkish government as a replacement of the Treaty of 1939 with Britain, but a

complementary to it in order to strengthen their relations with the West as a whole. Most probably, this policy was also another Turkish attempt to establish another balance between the warring parties. That is why Turkey did not hesitate to inform the British Ambassador in Ankara about the negotiations leading to the Turco-German Treaty in 1941. It is an interesting point that the British Ambassador as well did not perceive it as any sign of pro-German act and noted in his memories that "the Turks were driven by hard practical considerations into making their Treaty with Germany. It was in no sense due to inclination or sentiment they did so" (Knatchbull-Hugessen 1949: 170).

The Treaty of 1941 was an issue, but pan-Turkism was another one that deserves some more attention, since, not only some of the political leaders, but also many people in Turkey supported Germany without any hesitation. As we have made a detailed analysis of this subject in another article (Çalış 1997: 103-114), there is no need to repeat all the arguments. But, in order to make some points clearer, we have to note here that Germanophile sentiments and the defeating of Russia by Germany during WWII went beyond simple a security issue for some of the Turks. Security was, of course, an indispensable part of the TFP, but Turkish interest in defeating the Soviet Union had also emerged from ideological factors. Of them, the resurrection of pan-Turkism which played a role, in this or that way, in shaping foreign policy during the war deserves more attention. Although it was scrapped by Kemalist Turkey as a policy option as in the cases of Islamism and Ottomanism, the Kemalists were, in fact, nationalist leaders as much as Westernist. No doubt, they certainly fed up on Turkism by nationalist discourses and policies in the 1930s. The rise of nationalism in Europe further justified Turkism while Turkey was officially declaring Islamist and even socialist movements as illegal. No doubt that they already created a positive milieu for pan-Turkist movements for a united Turkic world when Operation Barbarossa attack was launched. Therefore, the Germans found this milieu as appropriate to use it for a common ground to move the Turks against the Soviet Union (Çalış 1997: 103-114; Özdoğan 1994: 357-372; Hostler 1993: 132-141; Landau 1995: 111-135).

During the war, Şükrü Saraçoğlu and Numan Menemencioğlu appeared to be among those men who were indeed delighted by the idea of a united Turkic world. For instance, Saraçoğlu told von Papen that "Turkey could not remain disinterested in the fate of 40 million people of Turkish origin in Russia", in the case of Russia's total defeat that would permit "a reorganization of the Russian realm". To him, "the union of these areas with Turkey... was hardly possible; perhaps, however, the areas could receive administrative autonomy with a strong cultural affiliation with Turkey" (DGFP 1964: 632-633). Within this psychological mood, Hitler began declaring how important Turkey's friendship was for the Germans while attempting to raise doubts between Turkey and Britain. If not making it an ally to Germany, the second option for the Nazis was to keep Turkey neutral, but as a friend of Germany, not that of Britain. Such a policy would work indeed to some extent for a while. For instance, the Saraçoğlu government allowed German ships to pass the Straits, carrying war materials to help anti-British uprising in Iraq (Leitz 2000: 88-92) In addition, the Turkish government also let some pan-Turkist circles flourish, even to have contacts directly with the Germans for the freedom of "Turkdom" living under the Soviet yoke (DGFP 1964: 284-707; Hostler 1993: 133-139; Landau 1995: 108-112).

In the meantime, some circles in Turkey also attempted to affect the government to be sided with Nazis (Çalış 1999: 82-83). In spite of all pro-German attempts, the question of how far the İnönü government officially supported the pan-Turkist activities both in Turkey and the Soviet Union still needs to be clarified. For instance, Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen maintains the absence of "even the slightest justification for the notion that the Turkish government had irredentist

ambitions in regard to Turkish populations" (Knatchbull-Hugessen 1949: 138). In this respect, Germans also had a very similar impression from the Turkish government. German State Secretary Ernest von Weizacker, after having had a talk with Nuri Pasha, in Berlin, noted that "his own (the Turkish) government was pursuing different ideas... I therefore wished to ask whether he should not first of all exert influence at home. Nuri Pasha conceded this; actually, he had been trying to do what was necessary in this regard for a long time" (DGFP XIII, 1964: 473).

No doubt that some attempts had been made to persuade top-level decision-makers in Ankara for a more active policy in favor of 'slave Turks' in Russia (Hostler 1993: 131-139). Yet, it is still possible to argue that the Saraçoğlu government tried to appease Germany by voicing up Turkist sentiments as they liked, most probably under the knowledge of İnönü, the Turks certainly did it to maintain the balance between the Axis and the Allies, while both sides were increasing pressures on Turkey. However, when it was understood that Turkey was no longer need such a policy, as the war was not going to be as it was anticipated by the Turkist circles, and when the defeat of Germany was accepted as inevitable at the second half of 1944, Ankara began changing not only discourses, but took a strong anti-Turanist position, banished pan-Turanist activities and prosecuted leading figures of the movement and even more put some of them in prison while shifting more its foreign policy towards the Allies, including the Soviet Union. That is simply because Turkey's main concern was neither pan-Turkist ideology nor the Germans, but its own survival. Therefore, when İnönü felt necessary to change it, he simply changed it (Weisband 1973: 242-249).

MISTRUSTS, PHOBIAS AND HYPOCRICIES

Before returning back to the developments taking place during WWII, there are still some important points that need to be discussed here. Crises of confidence arising from mistrusts between all parties, the Russian phobia and British intrigues are the points that also help us to understand Turkey's neutrality and its relations in the war. In addition to economy and security reasons, there were indeed psychological reasons that deeply affected Turkey's choices during the war. Some of them emerged from Turkey's historical experiences. Turkey was an ally of the Germans while fighting for life against the Russians during the First World War and some of the Turkish soldiers who took part in the war shoulder by shoulder with the Germans were now in power. Secondly, the Turks, in general, had different images about the Russians and the Germans. They historically accepted Germany as an indispensable part of the West and Europe as a civilized nation, they always perceived the Russians as some sort of barbarous ones. If to say it in a nutshell, the Russians did not have a positive image compared to the Germans in Turkey (Çalış 1997: 108-111; Çalış 1999: 73-110).

Thirdly, the Turks could not trust any side of the warring nations in essence. All the warring parties approached Turkey in order to push it towards the war on their side, but they never took into account Turkey's demands and interests. The Turks also had the impression that these parties had secret agendas as well concerning the position of Turkey after the war. Ankara, for example, was completely shocked when it was informed by Germany about Hitler's secret talks with Molotov in November 1940 regarding Russian demands from Turkey, as we have noted in previous pages. Certainly, it reminded Turkey of some secret agreements that had taken place between imperialist powers including Britain and Russia before and during the First World War.

Fourthly, behind Turkey's distrust of fighting countries, the role of Britain must be taken seriously (Tamkin 2008: 749-766; Tamkin 2009). In order to understand this psychological mood, we have to return back to the beginning of the Soviet-British alliance. When Germany started

Operation Barbarossa against Russia, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, declared Britain's unconditional support to the Soviet Union. This declaration was not welcomed by the Turks since they were not totally against Operation Barbarossa. Further to this, Churchill's references to the Russians' efforts during WWI re-activated Turkey's bad memories about the Russian attacks on the Ottomans and atrocities they caused in Anatolia with the help of some minorities like the Armenians, in addition to the secret Constantinople Agreement of March 1918 that was signed between Britain, Russia, and France (Çalış 1999: 83-84; Deringil 1989: 123; Gürün 1965: 239-240).

Therefore, aware of this fact, von Papen did not give away from attempting to have the support of the Turks by playing with the card of the Russian-phobia. As part of his policy, he always kept Ankara informed on negative developments concerning Turkey that took place in London and Moscow. By this Russian card, the German Ambassador hoped to create a common base to suck Turkey into the war on their front. On the other hand, at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, when the Nazis expected a prompt victory over the Russians, they asked from Turkey to side with Germany. But, within very short time, they had to change this policy in favor of keeping Turkey neutral because this neutrality which created a natural barrier in the South-East European front served more for the interests of Germany. After the failure of the pro-German coup attempt in Iraq, Turkey's neutrality became indeed a real asset for the Germans while fighting against the Russians. The Nazis thought of attacking on Turkey as well, but the failure of Operation Barbarossa obstructed, most probably, Germany opening another front in the war.

In fact, until the Casablanca Conference, Turkey's neutrality and friendship in this period were also appreciated by both the British and the Russians, since it provided, for them as well, a reliable security zone in the Straits and the southern borders of Russia, and "a bulwark or protective pad against German penetration into the Middle East" (Knatchbull-Hugessen 1949: 180-203-204). Therefore, the British and the Soviets published a joint declaration in August 1941 in order to assure Ankara of their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and the respect of Turkey's territorial integrity. They also declared that in the case of an attack by any European power, London and Moscow would be ready to provide every help and assistance to Turkey (Çalış 1999: 84; TCDB 1982: 126).

However, these declarations would not relief Turkey, mainly since Iran had been in the meantime invaded by the Allied troops. Then Ankara felt to protest this invasion by underlining similarities between Iran and Turkey. The case of Iran was mostly interpreted by the Turks as an illegal action, aggression, and occupation. Yet, this situation was further aggravated by the Soviet misbehaviors in the occupation zone that was largely populated by Azerbaijani Turks (Deringil 1989: 126-128; Çalış 1999: 84-85).

Meanwhile, the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's visit to Moscow in December 1941, following the USA's entry into the war, made the matters worse. At his first meeting with Eden, Stalin also suggested, in addition to many other matters concerning the future of Europe, to offer the Dodecanese Islands and certain districts in Bulgaria, and possibly also in northern Syria to Turkey as a price for its entry into the war on their side (Eden 1965: 335; Çalış 1999: 85-86). When the news of the offer reached to Ankara, the Turkish government simply regarded it as a new Russian conspiracy in order to conceal, if not justify, their demands on the Straits in return. For instance, the reaction of Saraçoğlu was ironic in appearance, but enough clear and short in substance to show Turkey's position: "That would not be nearly enough, he said; I must have Scotland as well" (Knatchbull-Hugessen 1949: 177-178).

On the other hand, Britain's policy to support Turkey's neutrality was not yet changed and

this policy continued until the Allied victory at El-Alamein in North Africa and the Russian successful campaign against Germany in Stalingrad. But, towards the end of 1942, Churchill took a leading role on Turkey's entry into the war. At the time, according to Churchill, Turkey would be an asset for the Allies in general, but its military power to stop Germany in the South-Eastern Europe, in particular, would be as vital at the first stage (Howard 1974: 169-171). For this reason, Churchill appeared to be absolutely determined for bringing Turkey in the war so much so that he also prepared himself to use, in any case, even the card of the Russian phobia in a similar way the Germans did it to convince Turkey. President Roosevelt and Stalin endorsed Churchill since they also believed in Turkey's active participation in the war, by the spring of 1943, that would be "of great importance in order to accelerate the defeat of Hitler and his accomplices" (Churchill 1953: 696; FRUS 1968: 487-849; Çalış 1999: 87-89). Then, the message of Churchill to make a meeting to settle down problems was transferred to Ankara without any reference for prompt participation in the war, but to consider it as an option (Knatchbull-Hugessen 1949: 184-186). Upon Churchill's request, Turkey suggested Adana as the place of meeting to discuss the possibility of joining the war.

Bargaining as a Power

At the first Adana meeting, or conference as some refer it, Churchill related to President İnönü how the Allies, particularly Britain and the USA desired Turkey's active participation in the war on their side. Aware of Turkey's situation, Churchill said, they would provide assistance to Turkey with all possible means. During the conference, Churchill insisted that they were in full agreement that Turkey be associated with the West not merely closing stages of the war, but in the general work of rehabilitation to follow it. Churchill also expressed his desire to see Turkey as a full partner in the peace conference where all matters concerning changes in the status quo of Europe. (Churchill 1953: 706-709; Oran 451-453).

Secondly, Churchill tried to assure the Turks, after expressing their anxiety on the matter of the Russians, that the USSR was no longer the same with the old Russia, and that their communist system had "already been modified". According to Churchill, there was, therefore, no reason to fear from "today's Soviets". He believed that the Soviets would have no option but to co-operate with the West after the war. For Churchill, if the Russians would become a danger in the future, as the Turkish leaders thought of it, Ankara would find an international organization that would support Turkey's case at any cost as a whole. According to Churchill, Turkey "should be strong and closely associated with" Britain and the US, and then there would not be nothing about to be worried by Turkey. As a conclusion, he said: "it was, after all, in Turkey's interest to place herself in line with the victorious nations" (Knatchbull-Hugessen 1949: 188-189; Esmer and Sander 1991: 172-179; Deringil 1989: 145-149; Gürün 1965: 249-252).

The first Adana meeting ended on 1 February 1943 with no conclusion in fact. However, according to Churchill and Hughe, it was successful, since, they thought, "we could count on them [Turks], if required, as soon as they were adequately equipped". Particularly Churchill appeared to be satisfied by İnönü as to the future of Turkey's relations with the Allies. To him, "there is no doubt the Turks have come a long way towards us" (Knatchbull-Hugessen 1949: 189-190; Churchill 1953: 609). However, the Adana talks marked that the Turks and British had different ideas about each other and conflicting objectives in their minds while coming together. Confirming this analysis, Feridun Cemal Erkin concludes that during the conference and in the months following it, the Turks and the British had used entirely different languages: "when the British spoke of wanting Turkey 'to be strong' they meant 'for war'. When the Turks spoke of their needs to be strong they

meant 'so that we can stay out'" (Erkin 1968: 199; Howard 1974: 174; Deringil 1989: 145-146; Çalış 1999: 90-94).

After the Adana meeting, President İnönü and his associates including Saraçoğlu and Menemencioğlu and Çakmak were still not convinced about the future of Europe, the position of Germany and Russia, and the consequences of this composition for Turkey's future. To the Turks, in the absence of Germany, which was thought to be a shield against communist expansionism, it would be more than unlikely to stop Stalin's Russia. On this point, the western powers, especially Britain, were seen by the Turks as ignorant and insensitive. Apart from this, pushing Turkey into the war was in fact a black point and like a double-edged knife for all the parts as well. Even though Germany could be sacrificed for the sake of general peace in Europe, it was not clear that what sort of contribution to the Allies Turkey would make. Militarily speaking, as we have already noted, although it kept a large number of men under service, Turkey was certainly in a weak position compared to Russia and Germany in any standard. In theory, Turkey's declaration of war seemed to be an asset in itself, but realist Turks thought just the reverse, simply because this would inevitably anger Germans. If this would happen, the Turks asked, who would defend Turkey without modern weapons in the event of German offense, particularly by airplanes? British Ambassador, for instance, accepted the likelihood of such a German attack on Turkey, even after the Adana meetings. He noted that "Germans intensified their threat of action and especially of air bombardment should Turkey declare [war] against them... A few bombs on [Istanbul]... would have created a situation which might have thrown the whole country into confusion." (Erkin 1968: 176, 191-192; Knatchbull-Hugessen 1949: 189-190)

Therefore, the Turks who then concerned much about a German attack could not decide straightforwardly on entering the war when Churchill asked for it. At the first Cairo Conference held in November 1943, Minister Menemencioğlu, had only this question in mind when he met Eden who still insisted on Turkey's entry into the war or at least having permission to use Turkish airbases. At the end of the conference, Menemencioğlu replied him by saying that "You want to sacrifice us in order to make Russians happy. In case we go now into the war, the Straits and İstanbul will easily fall under German occupation. Shall we then await Russians' coming to beat Germany and to save İstanbul? Do you think that in such a situation Russians would save İstanbul only for me?". Saving by the Russians would be indeed only a nightmare for the Turks (Erkin 1968: 191; TCDB 1982: 152-160; Deringil 1989: 154-155; Weisband 1973: 221).

Several months later, during the Second Cairo meetings, the Turkish President, İnönü repeated the very same arguments, though he appeared to accept Turkey's entry into the war in principle. He told Roosevelt and Churchill how the Turkish army had an outdated and insufficient arsenal and said that at that stage Turkish entry would be a burden rather than an asset for the Allies. The occupation of the Straits and İstanbul would be good for Germans only, or a 'savor' that would later come to Turkey's help. It was then clear that this savor would not be someone else, but only Russia that was regarded by the Turks as the first and foremost principal threat (Esmer-Sander 1991: 185; Oran 2001: 458-464; Weisband 1973: 142-149).

During the war, Ankara indeed had the impression that Britain never had empathy with Turkey and its warnings on the Russian factor. Nor did the Americans understand and show any interest in Turkey's ontological concerns about it. But, for the Turkish government, the approach of Britain was much more important than any other power and Britain's failure to take the Turkish advice seriously, which was made particularly in Adana, left the Turkish government in limbo "with further distrust of Britain" (Kuniholm 1980: 33).

Shifts in Diplomacy and the End of WWII

It was indeed very obvious that during WWII Turkey was badly treated by the Allied powers. There was not only diplomacy, encouragement, and hard bargaining on the stage, but also threats, intrigues, espionages and even sabotages (Atlı 2014: 55-71; Avcı 2015: 202-219; Baxter 2008: 807-826). Particularly Churchill's attitudes illustrated the faces of hypocrites in this period. On the one hand, he gave guaranty to the Turks about the Soviets in Adana, on the other in Teheran he invoked Stalin by declaring that the Soviets holding such an extensive land "deserved" the access to warm waters. When he was with Stalin, he had no objection to "Russians' legitimate" demands on the Turkish straits. In addition, Churchill also expressed, behind closed doors, his ideas as to see "Russian fleets, both naval and merchant, on all the seas of the world." Further to all of these, not only Stalin but also Churchill and Roosevelt did not hesitate to threat İnönü if he did not accept their invitation to take part in this war on their side. It was the case in Cairo for instance. As we have already noted, he stressed in Cairo, if Turkey missed the chance of alignment with them, later it might find itself alone and isolated "not on the bench but wandering about in court." after the war (Çalış 1999: 73-110; Weisband 1973: 199-224; Kuniholm 1980: 40-44. Howard 1974: 186-193).

On the other hand, it is nearly impossible to say that Turkey had a better record in this respect. The Turks also preferred following a double-edged diplomacy while conducting negotiations. They acted as if they accepted something in principle but with some conditions before making of it. The case of Adana meetings and negotiations following them are particularly instructive so much so that as we have previously touched, the British delegation was happy when they left Turkey since they thought they got what they wanted from the Turks. To be fair, it must be noted here that Britain made indeed hard works to meet Turkish demands in accordance with the Adana decisions. But, it was clear on the other hand that Turkey played with the British experts for a long time, while leaning on the lists of demands and attempted to extend the bargaining process as much as possible. Perhaps Britain also had some other things in mind, but this Turkish reluctance made the British diplomats sick of negotiations with the Turks. No doubt that changing and growing Turkish demands with many long lists played a great role in deteriorating relations with Britain after the Second Cairo Conferences in particular (Weisband 219-224).

It is also true that Turkey did not want to be a direct part of this war, but the Turkish authorities endlessly repeated their faith in the friendship with Britain and in the principles of the Turco-British pact of 1939. According to Ambassador Hugessen "from top to down, all Turkish leaders leading by İnönü" wholeheartedly believed in the policy of friendship with Britain and those nations who fought for the benefit of civilization and freedom. In November 1943, İnönü said in a speech that "we wish the victors of this world war to be civilization and humanity" (Knatchbull-Hugessen 1949: 193). Two years later from that speech, when the war was approaching to end, İnönü clarified that their sympathies laid with Britain. As an answer to speculations and accusations about Turkish non-belligerency, he also declared that there was only Turkey as a country that openly sided with Britain and France from the beginning of the war. However, as we have already noted, Turkey followed a foreign policy that did not undermine the position of Germany as well on the one hand and took a slow approach in developing relations with Britain on the other. After 1943, this policy annoyed Britain in particular and when the British diplomats realized Turkey's game, they did not hesitate in leaving it alone and cutting off relations in February 1944 (Erkin 1968: 228-232).

Also, it is indeed instructive to know that ambassadors in Ankara, from both of the parties, had similar impressions, and they were sure that the Turks did love their respective countries only. On the one hand, Papen reported many times how the Turkish leaders expressed their pro-German feelings and their desire for a German victory. On the other hand, the British ambassador, Sir Hughe, wrote in his memories that "one thing was never in doubt, namely Turkey's intense desire for an Allied victory and her recognition of the fact that her own prosperity if not her existence depended on the close friendship of the Allies and in particular of Great Britain" (Knatchbull-Hugessen 1949: 204).

They seemed to be contradictory statements, but they were not. As it had happened to many small or medium power countries, Turkey, too, attempted muddling through during the war. It was the case after the Adana meeting in particular, and Turkey began providing some important services for the Allies especially for Britain, too, while shifting its external and internal policies in accordance with the Allies' demands, but slowly. First of all, in September 1943 at a time when Britain asked to use Turkish mainland and communication facilities in order to supply for its military forces in the Dodecanese Islands, Turkey rendered every help during the operation to evacuate the British forces. It was however obvious that such assistance carried great risk for Turkey since Germany could have attacked it. (Deringil 1989: 150-152). Secondly, the *Varlık Vergisi* (Tax on Wealth) was also canceled in February 1944 and all related penalties were written off as a positive response to the pressures of the Western powers. Thirdly, in order to appease the Soviet Union in particular, Turkey closed all pan-Turkist associations, banished their publications and arrested their leading figures, as we have analyzed in the previous pages. Fourthly, in order to further satisfy British and American demands, concerning the chromite issue, Ankara announced in April 1944 that all chrome arrangements with Germany were to cancel (Çalış 1997: 119-120; Weisband 244-246, 256-257).

Sixthly, about two months later in June 1944, pro-German foreign minister, Numan Menemencioglu resigned from his post because he resisted to the Allies' pressures on Ankara to stop the Axis shipping, but everybody knows that Turkey was trying to adapt its policies to the changing circumstances of the war. After him, İnönü appointed Hasan Saka as the foreign minister, who appeared to be a pro-British politician, and reshuffled Saraçoğlu government re-interpreted the Montreux Convention in accordance with the British demands while closing the Turkish straits to the ships of the Axis powers at all. As the last step before declaring war, in conformity of the British proposal, the National Assembly unanimously voted, on 2 August 1944, for a resolution to break off all relations with Germany (ZC 1944: 3-11).

When Britain decided to cut off all relations with Turkey, because of its neutrality and endless bargaining tactics, Stalin and Roosevelt had already begun changing their minds about Turkey's active participation, contrary to the expectations of Churchill. As we have analyzed in the previous pages, Turkey would also adjust its internal and external policies and then sever its economic and political ties with Italy and Germany before declaring war against the Axis powers. Indeed, Turkey continued to make further gestures to gain the sympathy of the Western powers. It allowed all British and American ships to pass the Straits in order to transport military supplies to the Soviets. However, all of these would not be enough to make them happy about Turkey. Then, Turkey declared war on Germany on 23 February 1945, despite it was a symbolic action (Howard, 1974: 208; Erkin, 1968: 242; ZC, 1945: 126-131; TCDB, 244; Weisband, 1973: 302-303). In the meantime, Japan surrendered unconditionally and WWII ended officially on 15 August 1945.

STATECRAFT AND LEADERSHIP THAT KEPT TURKEY OUT OF THE WAR

As far as decision making is concerned, not many but few people took an effective role in shaping this policy. When the war was started, Turkey was ruled by a single party with an authoritarian style of government. In appearance, parliamentarism was applied in the system, but the RPP and its leader took control of everything since 1923. The leader did not only determine important figures in politics but also decided all the members of the National Assembly by selecting all candidates. Also, he chose prime ministers and cabinet members and appointed high-level bureaucrats. In short, all policies including foreign policy revolved around the leader, i.e., the President.

When İsmet İnönü became president, he inherited such a system and continued to exert even more control over politics as the national chief (*Milli Şef*). In a world of fascism and Nazism, the chief's authoritarianism was not seen strange phenomenon, but, to be fair, the war did not leave any room for İnönü to think much of changing single-party system and authoritarian and totalitarian aspects of the regime. Instead, the war conditions compelled İnönü, in this or that way, to concentrate on the future of the war and its impacts on the position of the country until the last hour. İnönü and his environment also concentrated on foreign policy since they perceived it as a matter of survival (Aydemir 2 1979:199).

When he became president, İnönü therefore had to work with a small group consisting of the prime minister, foreign minister and chief of staff when taking any decision. During the war, he ratified three governments with two prime ministers. When the war started, the prime minister was Refik Saydam. In 1942, Şükrü Saraçoğlu was appointed as prime minister and stayed in power until August 1946 with a renovation in 1943 and reshuffling his cabinet in 1944. Before assuming this job, Saraçoğlu was the minister for foreign affairs. He was replaced in the ministry by Numan Menemencioğlu who served as the General Secretary of Saraçoğlu when the latter was acting as the minister. Menemencioğlu was forced to resign from his job in 1944 when Turkey began cutting off relations with Germany since he was regarded as a pro-German minister. It was about the same time Fevzi Çakmak who had served as the Chief of General Staff since 1922 had to leave the office with similar reasons. President İnönü finished the war with Hasan Saka as foreign minister and Kazım Orbay as the Chief of General Staff. The Head of the National Assembly was Abdulhalik Renda during all the period from 1935 up to 1946. All the rest including the party, the assembly and even media was mostly used in order to manipulate public opinion to support official policies made under the control of İnönü (Koçak 2 2007:134-141; Aydemir 2 1979: 137-278).

As the previous parts of the chapter also reveal, these leaders might have different ideas about the war, the warring countries, and Turkey's position. Some of them thought to side with Britain, as some others attempted to influence the decisions of the government to support Germany. However, none of them was in favor of joining the war as a belligerent country. Despite of their favored country, they always played for time in order not to be a direct part of neither the Axis nor the Allied powers. Saraçoğlu and Menemencioğlu, for instance, seemed to be pro-German, but there was no any hard evidence demonstrating that they really desired to participate in this war on the side of Germany as well. Similarly, the case of Fevzi Çakmak reveals us a different story than just a man with pro-German ideas as some claimed. No doubt that he took an active role during the war, but not in the game of neither Germany nor Britain. His activities were directly related to Turkey's national interest which was related to the policy of neutrality, and he accordingly kept close contacts with the representative of the warring parties most probably for

tactical purposes. Like many others among the leading cadres, he was master of bargaining and tactics, which was illustrated by the case of Adana meetings. İnönü promised Churchill to side with them in principle, but provided that Turkey's economic conditions must be taken into account and its military demands were fully met. When Turkey was asked for a list of needs, Çakmak provided one for military requirements that was impossible to fulfill it within a couple of years. According to the list, Turkey required items of every description including tanks, guns, bullets, airplanes, trucks, locomotives and even coal for the locomotives. In a report of that time, it was estimated that only the transportation of these materials could be completed not less than six years with the facilities Turkey had at the time. For only transportation, Turkey needed to construct many new roads, ports and airports, leave aside renovating all of its infrastructure (Yalçın 2011: 724; Öztoprak 2000 A: 597-618; Öztoprak 2000 B: 153-192; Özlü 2012: 444-478).

In addition to bargaining, long meetings, conversations and expert exchanges of views, another interesting mechanism the leaders of Turkey used during the War was the diplomacy of intelligence. As a neutral country, Turkey became a center of activities for intelligence organizations from all over the world, but the British and German intelligence services, in particular, made Ankara a capital for spies. The Cicero Affair, which took place between Britain and Germany illustrate this point very clearly. Nicknamed by Papen as Cicero, Elyesa Bazna, who was a Turkish citizen with Albanian origin, carried out one of the most famous espionage affairs in the world, while most probably working as a double agent during the war. When he was an active employee of the British Embassy as servant-valet, he photographed many secret documents related to war plans and negotiations between the Allies including the subject of Turkey's entry into the war. He transferred all of the info to the German intelligent units for a great deal of money between October 1943 and April 1944 (Baxter 2008: 807-826; Gülmez ve Demirsoylu 2013: 414-430). However, as Weiss puts it, "many of the documents were extremely valuable, but the dictatorship [in Germany] never used the information effectively" (Weiss 1999: ix).

No doubt that İnönü as the most powerful actor in decision making played a great role in keeping Turkey outside of the War. Certainly, he was worried much about the future of Turkey's position in the world. At the beginning of the war, as it happened to many Turks, he did not expect Germany and Russia coming together as allies, the German-Russian pact therefore affected his psychology terribly. When the news about the German attack on Russia reached him, he had a deep breath, as many did in Turkey, and "started laughing continuously for nearly ten minutes" after the news (Hakki 2007: 44-67). Certainly, all the Turkish decision makers had lived under great stress since the beginning of the war including İnönü. However, İnönü generally took a cool approach, knew not to act with enthusiasm and preferred using diplomatic tactics to gain more time, while appearing to be always ready for negotiations. Occasionally, he played off one actor against the other in order to keep them in balance with vague promises. He never lost contact with the warring countries, and always opened diplomatic channels with foreign ambassadors. For instance, neither Papen nor Hughes had any difficulty to reach İnönü (Aydemir 2 1979: 137-198, 249-294). When someone attempted to criticize İsmet İnönü, after his term as president finished, for the hard times during the War, he would reply him, "but I have not left your children fatherless" (Oran 2001: 398).

Certainly, the Turks who were aware of some of intelligent activities, if not as a whole, did not simply watch them or let the spies go with what they had done in Ankara (Seydi 2004: 75-85). On the contrary to some who assert that Turkey ignored the side of the intelligence of the war, recent researches establish that the Turks also interested closely in the field of espionage. They actively "tried to take their share from the intelligence, [and] endeavored to direct the intelligence liaison in their favor. Particularly Ankara employed intelligence diplomacy as a mechanism to maintain the country's independence and

territorial integrity". Therefore, the Turkish authorities did not hesitate to play in the game of the intelligence and to keep contacts with all of the parties as much as possible. Ankara used intelligence diplomacy particularly in its relations with Britain not to be trapped for joining the war on their side, while attempting to keep Germany and Russia away from assaulting on its frontiers. "During the course of war, Turks also did not hesitate serving the intelligence needs of France and USA on occasions that the actions would serve to Turkey to gain material and strategic benefit from it" (Bezci 2016:1).

CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of WWII, the Soviet Union unexpectedly approached Germans and they signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression on 23 August 1939. Ankara was caught surprised by the Soviet-German treaty, but they soon realized that if this Treaty would result with a pact this would be a nightmare for Turkey's security in case of a war in Europe. In order to establish a balance, Turkey signed the Tripartite Agreement with Britain and France, despite the fact that it was essentially designed to counterbalance Italy in the Mediterranean region. However, by using it, Turkey declared its neutrality at the very beginning of the war and managed to be so until the last hours of the war.

Until the end of 1943, Turkey also preferred to follow a foreign policy that could be perceived as a pro-German one, mainly because Germany was accepted as a civilized European nation. In addition to this, there were also many other reasons such as, the Soviet (Russian) phobia, foreign trade with Germany (especially chromium for arms), pan-Turkist movements, Papen's efforts and Germany's impressive military superiority that played a cumulative role in Turkey's pro-German position. However, especially after the failure of Operation Barbarossa, Turkey's attitude began to change in favor of the Allies.

Yet, the nightmare of the Turks did not stop there because of the rise of Russia a powerful actor in the war. Historically the Turks did not possess a positive image about the Russians as a nation. Russian imperialist policies since the middle ages created a kind of Russian phobia among the Turks. This phobia certainly resurfaced during the war and the Soviet alignment with Britain and USA did not help but exacerbated it. According to the Turks, not the Germans but the Soviets, first of all, must be kept under control for the future of Europe. Realizing this problem of image, both of the sides of the war, attempted to convince Turkey for their causes by putting emphasis more on the Soviet factor. Despite the fact that German influence on Turkey was fading away after 1943, Turkey did not accept, too, what the Allies offered. That is simply because the western countries did not really understand Turkey's fears about the Soviets and their expectations after the war. Even more they made secret talks at several instances with the Russians about Turkey's position after the war. When some of the talks were leaked to Turkey, it lost confidence all sides of the war, including Britain. After this point, none would be able to convince Turkey to be a part of the war.

If Turkey was able to maintain its flexible, but neutral position until the last hour, it was mainly because the men who made TFP believed that the war would not be to the benefit of Turkey in any case. Most of the Turkish decision-makers took roles in the Ottoman army and experienced devastating effects of WWI. Of them, President İnönü was one of the most determined leaders for not entering into any war with any reason on any side of the warring parties. Uncertain conditions, false and vague promises also compelled İnönü, in this or that way, to concentrate on the future of the war and its impacts on the position of his country. Not only İnönü, but also all leading figures in Turkey regarded foreign policy as a matter of survival and used all diplomatic means including bargaining, long meetings, conversations, expert exchanges, and the intelligence to keep the country out of the war.

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