

PLANNING AND THE PRE-STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT ERA IN TURKEY FROM A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE PERSPECTIVE: A THEORETICAL DECIPHERING

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ABSTRACT: Public administration reforms in Turkey entered a new phase in the 2000s, placing the concept of "strategic planning" at their core. However, this new paradigm did not emerge in a vacuum; rather, it was constructed upon the robust legacy of the pre-1980 "developmental state." This article analyzes Turkey's planning experience through the lens of Chalmers Johnson's "plan-rationality," Peter Evans's "embedded autonomy," and Alice Amsden's "late industrialization" theories. The central thesis of the study posits that while the "imperative and macro-comprehensive" planning approach of the pre-1980 period represents a structural break from today's "flexible and institutional" strategic management paradigm, persistent centralist tendencies within the administrative culture have transformed this transition into a crisis of "formalism."

Key Words: Developmental State, State Planning Organization (SPO), Five-Year Development Plans, Public Administration Reform, Strategic Management, Paradigm Shift.

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TÜRKİYE'DE PLANLAMA VE STRATEJİK YÖNETİM ÖNCESİ DÖNEMİN KALKINMACI DEVLET PERSPEKTİFİNDEN İNCELENMESİ: KURAMSAL BİR ÇÖZÜMLEME

ÖZ: Türkiye'de kamu yönetimi reformları, 2000'li yıllarda "stratejik planlama" kavramını merkeze alarak yeni bir evreye girmiştir. Ancak bu yeni paradigma, boşluğa değil, 1980 öncesinin güçlü "kalkınmacı devlet" (developmental state) mirasının üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Bu makale, Türkiye'nin planlama deneyimini; Chalmers Johnson'ın "plan-rasyonalite", Peter Evans'ın "gömülü özerklik" ve Alice Amsden'in "geç sanayileşme" kuramları eşliğinde analiz etmektedir. Çalışmanın temel savı, 1980 öncesi dönemin "emredici ve makro-kapsamlı" planlama anlayışının, bugünkü "esnek ve kurumsal" stratejik yönetim anlayışıyla yapısal bir kopuş yaşadığı; ancak idari kültürdeki merkezîyetçi eğilimlerin bu kopuşu bir "biçimsellik" krizine dönüştürdüğüdür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kalkınmacı Devlet, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (DPT), Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planları, Kamu Yönetimi Reformu, Stratejik Yönetim, Paradigma Değişimi,

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1. Introduction

The discipline of public administration has been influenced by various paradigms over time while defining the state's role in society and the economy. In the specific context of Turkey, 'planning' is not merely a technical tool for budgeting or forecasting; it is a manifestation of the 'intrinsic' role undertaken by the state in the construction of modern Turkey. The 'strategic planning' injected into the Turkish administrative system through the Public Financial Management and Control Law No. 5018 in 2003 is, in fact, a consequence of the state's transformation from a 'planner' into a 'regulator/manager.'

By focusing on the 'prelude' to strategic management, this article will discuss with theoretical depth why the pre-1980 developmental state practice did not necessitate strategic management and through which administrative mechanisms the planning approach of that period operated.

2. Theoretical Foundations: The Epistemology of the Developmental State

Although developmental state theory was primarily developed in the 1980s to explain the East Asian miracle, Turkey's 1930–1980 period largely embodies the core characteristics of this theory. In this model, rather than rejecting the market mechanism, the state constructs, guides, and disciplines the market toward rational objectives under conditions of 'late industrialization' where capital accumulation is insufficient.

Johnson categorizes states into two fundamental types: 'market-rational' and 'plan-rational' (Johnson, 1982). In market-rational systems, such as those in the UK and the USA, the role of the state is limited to that of a 'referee' who merely protects competition. Conversely, in Turkey's planning tradition, the state itself occupies the position of a 'decisive player.' From this perspective, planning is conceptualized as a form of rational intervention in areas where the market fails due to structural deficiencies. In pre-1980 Turkey, planning practice functioned as an 'overarching logic' (master intellect) that either substituted for the market or brought it under strategic discipline.

According to Evans, for a state to acquire a developmental identity, its bureaucracy must both establish organic ties with social actors (business world, labor unions) and be sufficiently meritocratic and autonomous so as not to succumb to the narrow interests of these groups (Evans, 1995). In Turkey, the State Planning Organization (SPO), established post-1961, is the most concrete institutional manifestation of this 'autonomous technocracy' ideal.

SPO personnel positioned themselves as an elite stratum dedicated to the ideal of 'scientific development,' insulated from the populist and short-term pressures of politics. This technocratic structure strengthened the state's capacity to act independently of the demands of capital groups when making strategic decisions.

The theoretical framework of the developmental state acquires a more distinct clarity through Alice Amsden's (1989) concept of 'late industrialization.' According to Amsden, in countries that trail behind in technological advancement, the state provides incentives to industrialists—such as low-cost credit, foreign exchange allocation, and customs protection—in exchange for their attainment of specific performance targets (Amsden, 1989). The sectoral supports observed in Turkey's planning practice between 1960 and 1980 are essentially part of this 'reciprocal discipline' mechanism. During this period, planning was not merely a tool that passively supported the private sector; rather, it functioned as an active control mechanism steering it in line with national industrialization goals.

At the core of the capitalist planning paradigm lies the state's activation of its 'coordination power' in instances where the market has not fully formed or fails to function efficiently. In Turkey, the position of the State Planning Organization (SPO) was designed specifically as a 'pilot agency' to remedy this lack of coordination. Pilot agencies possess the authority to align all units of the state toward a single macro-goal by synthesizing not only economic data but also social and institutional dynamics. This enabled the state to act with a holistic rationality 'from a single center,' in contrast to the fragmented and institution-based structure characteristic of strategic management.

As emphasized in Ha-Joon Chang's theoretical framework, the strength of the developmental state is derived from its 'institutional capacity' (Chang, 2002). In pre-1980 Turkey, the planning tradition represented not only the state's power to allocate resources but also its competence to design the future through scientific data and projections. The fundamental distinction between strategic management and this tradition lies in this very point: while developmental planning perceives the state as a 'chief architect' that transforms society, strategic management defines the state as an 'administrator' attempting to adapt to market conditions. Consequently, during the pre-1980 era, institutional efficiency was regarded as an integral but secondary component of the overarching national development vision.

When Turkey's planning experience is analyzed, it is observed that the process was initially shaped by a logic of 'sectoral development' aimed at revitalizing specific strategic industrial branches (textiles, paper, iron and steel, etc.). However, by the 1960s, this approach evolved into a phase of 'holistic development' aiming to rationalize the social structure in its entirety. This evolution resulted in the state positioning itself not merely as an economic interventionist but as an 'overarching will' modernizing every sphere of society. Due to this epistemological stance, generating their own micro-strategies was not seen as a necessity for public institutions in the pre-1980 era; because the macro plan had already assigned each institution its role within the general development process as a 'public duty'.

3. Historical Background (1923–1960): The 'Etatisme' Phase of Planning

In the early years of the Republic, planning was not merely a choice of economic policy; it was an overarching strategy for 'survival' and 'independence.' Etatisme, which sprouted at the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress but transformed into a necessity following the 1929 Great Depression, served as the initial laboratory for Turkey's planning tradition (Boratav, 2021).

The First Five-Year Industrial Plan (FFYIP), covering the 1933–1937 period, aimed essentially at creating national capital accumulation, although it was conceptualized with technical support from the Soviet Union. In this era, contrary to the contemporary understanding of strategic management, planning did not aim for micro-level institutional efficiency, but rather for 'the actualization of the institution itself and the industrial infrastructure.' Sümerbank and Etibank, as the executive arms of this plan on the ground, functioned as the first major apparatuses of the 'planning state' (Boratav, 2021). These institutions were not merely production units; with their worker housing, canteens, and social areas, they became the 'spatial representatives of modernization'.

The planning paradigm during the FFYIP period was rooted in a logic focused on 'sectoral development' (Pamuk, 2014). The objective here was to achieve domestic production of imported basic consumer goods (such as textiles, sugar, and paper) and to ensure foreign exchange savings. However, this sectoral focus led to the emergence of an 'autonomous yet centralized' model within the administrative structure of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). SEEs were conceptualized as rational administrative units to realize the objectives of the plan; this pioneered the development of the bureaucracy's technical capacity in Turkey. During this era, planning was more than a mere economic text; it was a political manifesto encompassing the goal of 'modernization' (asrileşme) for the society (Tekeli; İlkin, 1974).

The post-World War II era marks a significant turning point (scissors change) in Turkey's planning history. The 1947 Turkish Economic Development Plan (the Vaner Plan) was a product of the effort to align with the new world order established after the war (the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine). This plan provided the first signals of a transition from the industry-oriented 'inward-looking' development model of the 1930s to an 'outward-oriented' model prioritizing agriculture and transportation infrastructure (Tekeli; ilkin, 1974). By placing agriculture rather than industry at its core, the 1947 Plan presents a typical example of how the 'autonomy' of the developmental state can be constrained by the international political conjuncture.

"The Turkish Democrat Party (DP) era began with a harsh rhetoric of 'market liberalization' directed against planning and etatisme. During this period, rather than through central coordination, development was intended to be left to market dynamics under the ideal of 'creating a millionaire in every neighborhood.' However, this 'liberal leap,' lacking institutional coordination, soon led to the inefficient utilization of resources and the allocation of investments based on irrational political preferences. By the mid-1950s, the absence of a central authority (such as the SPO) triggered a duplication of public investments, a foreign exchange bottleneck, and a foreign debt crisis (Kuruç, 1987).

The crisis of planlessness during the Turkish Democrat Party era culminated in the severe stabilization measures announced in 1958 and the first stand-by agreement with the IMF. This crisis provided a bitter experience of the 'cost of planlessness' in public administration and constituted a 'counter-example' that paved the way for the strict planning era following 1960. According to the dominant view in the literature, the establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO) following the 1960 military intervention was not merely a political choice; it emerged as a rational antidote to the economic chaos created in the 1950s. Consequently, the pre-1960 period represents a paradoxical process in Turkey where even the 'absence' of planning served to rationalize the very need for it.

4. The State Planning Organization (SPO) Era: The Golden Age of Planning (1960–1980)

The post-1960 period is characterized as the 'golden age' in which planning in Turkey transcended being a mere instrument of economic policy and became a constitutional institution. Article 129 of the 1961 Constitution tasked the state with achieving economic and

social development 'through planning'; accordingly, the State Planning Organization (SPO) was established as the 'pilot agency' of the developmental state.

The SPO was designed as a superstructure positioned above the hierarchy of classical ministries, directly affiliated with the Prime Ministry and endowed with the authority to coordinate all public investments. This institutional design corresponds precisely with Chalmers Johnson's (1982) definition of a 'pilot agency.' The departments of Economic Planning, Social Planning, and Coordination within the SPO functioned to consolidate all state resources under a unified rationality. According to Tekeli, the establishment of the SPO constituted the administrative center of a 'technocratic enlightenment' in Turkey; the institution was positioned as a 'scientific bastion' where rational decisions were defended against political populism (Tekeli, 2010).

Unlike the sectoral approach of the 1930s, the planning practice of the 1960s was based on a 'rational-comprehensive' model. In this model, developed under the consultancy of Nobel laureate economist Jan Tinbergen, the entire economy was analyzed through macro-economic balances and input-output tables. During this period, planning possessed a 'mandatory' character for the public sector and an 'indicative' character for the private sector (Boratav, 2021). Growth targets and sectoral priorities determined through macro-models strictly specified where public resources would be channeled; this imposed a central discipline rather than the flexibility offered by contemporary strategic management.

The planning paradigm of this era focused not only on GDP growth but also on the transformation of the social structure. In this process initiated with the First Five-Year Development Plan (FFYDP), issues such as education, health, and the elimination of regional imbalances were regarded as integral parts of 'social planning.' Kuruç defines this period as a stage in which the state charted a 'modernization route' for society (Kuruç, 1987). Contrary to the micro-level approaches in strategic management where institutions focus on their own performance, the FFYDPs functioned as 'social contract' texts that assigned specific roles to every segment of society within the development process.

The existence of the SPO institutionalized the tension between the 'expert-technocrat' and the 'elected politician' within Turkish public administration. While planners viewed themselves as the rational defenders of the national interest, political administrations frequently characterized the constraints imposed by the plan as 'technocratic tutelage' (Türel, 2010). This tension serves as the most concrete arena for debating Evans' concept of

'embedded autonomy' in the Turkish context. Despite the political instability caused by coalition governments in the 1970s, the SPO succeeded in sustaining the state's long-term objectives—such as Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI)—by preserving its institutional capacity.

This centralized and holistic structure during the SPO era rendered the concept of institution-based 'strategic planning' both redundant and conceptually impossible for that period. As emphasized by Pamuk, since every public institution was conceptualized as an 'executive agent' of the central plan, the determination of independent visions and missions by these institutions would have been regarded as an 'administrative deviation' that threatened the integrity of the plan (Pamuk, 2014). Consequently, institutional autonomy—the cornerstone of strategic management—stands in diametric opposition to the hierarchical and rational-comprehensive genetic makeup of the pre-1980 developmental state.

5. The Tension Between Planning and Politics in Public Administration: A Conflict of Rationality

One of the most fundamental elements determining the characteristics of pre-1980 Turkish public administration is the tense relationship between the planning bureaucracy, representing technocratic rationality, and political power based on voter support. This tension is not merely a matter of power sharing; it is a clash between two different worldviews regarding 'how' and 'for whom' development should be pursued.

In the developmental state model, planners conceptualized themselves as the 'long-term, rational, and holistic' defenders of the national interest against the 'transitory, short-term, and fragmented' demands of politics. This situation was frequently characterized by political administrations as 'technocratic tutelage.' According to Tekeli, while SPO experts argued that there was only one 'scientific truth,' politicians emphasized the priority of 'the people's demands' (Tekeli, 2010). The conflicts experienced especially during the preparation of investment programs are the most concrete examples of this situation. While planners advocated for the concentration of investments in specific centers based on economies of scale and efficiency, politicians pushed for projects such as 'a factory for every province'—projects that were irrational from a planning perspective but carried high political returns (Kuruç, 1987).

This tension crystallized institutionally within the High Planning Council (HPC). Composed of the Prime Minister, relevant ministers, the Undersecretary of the SPO, and

department heads, this council served as the primary platform where 'technical knowledge' and 'political preference' confronted one another. In the literature, this structure is viewed as a balance between the political effort to establish control over planning and the technocratic resistance to preserve autonomy. Güler defines the HPC as an attempt to rationalize politics, while simultaneously pointing out that it was a medium where the mandatory nature of the plan was diluted through political bargaining (Güler, 2016). During this era, the plan was perceived as a 'shackle' narrowing the politician's room for maneuver, and the technocrat assumed the role of the rational watchdog of this shackle.

The most crucial element ensuring the hierarchical discipline and resistance capacity of pre-1980 public administration was the merit-based closed career system. During this period, the bureaucracy consisted of elites with a homogeneous educational and ideological background, emerging from institutions such as the Faculty of Political Sciences (Mülkiye) and METU. This 'technocratic caste' possessed an institutional culture that equated the survival of the state with development and perceived political interventions as a threat to the development process. The attempts of political administrations to 'politicize' the bureaucracy hit a formidable wall of merit and seniority during this period. This structure formed the administrative backbone that ensured the uncompromising implementation of the central plan at the institutional level (Pamuk, 2014).

During this period, the bureaucracy was not merely a technical staff implementing legislation; it was the 'custodian' of the state's modernization project. Evans' emphasis on 'autonomy' is embodied in the Turkish case by the bureaucracy's insulation from social and political pressure groups (Evans, 1995). The planning bureaucracy felt responsible not only to the government but also to history and the nation. This sense of 'epistemological superiority' stands in total opposition to the 'professional manager serving political superiors' model promised by strategic management. Consequently, in the pre-1980 administrative climate, planning functioned not as a tool directed by politics, but as a center of rationality seeking to discipline politics.

In conclusion, the pre-1980 planning-politics relationship cannot be explained through contemporary concepts of strategic management such as 'stakeholder participation' or 'governance.' The spirit of the era was shaped around the question: 'Who knows best?' The politician invoked the 'will of the nation,' while the technocrat referenced the 'rationality of science.' The absence of the concept of strategic planning in this period stemmed from the

concern that institutions declaring their own will would shatter this central 'rational integrity.' Centralism was not merely an administrative preference; it was a product of the belief in the indivisibility of rationality.

6. An Analytical Perspective on the 'Absence' of the Concept of Strategic Planning

The fact that the concept of 'strategic planning' found no place in either academic literature or administrative practice in pre-1980 Turkey is directly related to the state conception and administrative culture of the period, rather than being a technical deficiency. The core assumptions of strategic management—namely 'institutional autonomy,' 'result-orientedness,' and 'flexibility'—stand in epistemological incompatibility with the 'holistic,' 'procedure-oriented,' and 'centralist' structure of the developmental state. It is possible to deepen the analysis of this 'absence' under the following three main analytical headings:

From a developmental state perspective, the state is not an 'aggregate of agencies' composed of parts or autonomous units; rather, it is a holistic organization representing a single will and a national vision. In the pre-1980 administrative culture, 'strategy' was a macro concept determined solely at the national level and by the central government (through the SPO). As emphasized by Güler, the administrative structure during this period was based on a 'singular and hierarchical' logic (Güler, 2016). Consequently, for a ministry or a public institution to define a unique 'mission' or 'vision' independent of the 'national development' goal designated by the center would have been perceived as a fragmentation of central authority and administrative anarchy during that period. The institutional micro-visions of strategic management found no conceptual equivalent within the macro-teleological integrity of the developmental state.

Pre-1980 public administration practice, similar to Max Weber's 'ideal type' bureaucracy, defined rationality through legality and procedural compliance (Ergun, 2004). In this structure, the success of the civil servant and the institution was measured not by 'achieving strategic goals' or 'creating an impact' (output/outcome), but through 'complying with the law and procedure' (compliance). Administrative audit mechanisms (such as the Court of Accounts and the Council of State) focused on the legal form of expenditures and transactions rather than performance indicators. This situation rendered the inherent necessity of strategic planning—namely, 'adapting strategies to shifting conditions' or 'flexibility'—entirely impossible. For institutions, the primary success criterion was not 'doing

the right thing' but 'doing things by the book'; this constituted the most significant cultural barrier to strategic thinking.

The applicability of strategic planning is contingent upon the institution having discretionary authority over its own resources (managerialism). However, in the pre-1980 period, resource allocation was managed through strict centralism by the SPO and the Ministry of Finance. Investment programs and budget items were communicated 'top-down' in accordance with the priorities of the central plan. Unless there was financial autonomy to fund such priorities, determining the 'strategic priorities' of institutions would have remained nothing more than a meaningless academic exercise. Since the budget system of the period was 'input-oriented' (line-item budgeting), spending units were expected to consume their allocated appropriations within the prescribed procedures rather than producing visionary projects. This 'financial tutelage' structurally prevented the emergence of a strategic declaration of will at the institutional level.

Lastly, 'institutional data analysis' and 'stakeholder participation,' which are required by strategic management, contradict the technocratic knowledge hierarchy of the period. Between 1960 and 1980, the monopoly of developmental data and information belonged to the SPO. Sub-institutions were positioned merely as 'implementers' that generated data but lacked the authority to transform this data into strategy. Tekeli defines this structure as a process in which information is centralized, and local/institutional knowledge is dissolved within the rationality of the macro plan (Tekeli, 2010). The absence of stakeholder participation or participatory strategy-making processes at the institutional level is a result of the unshakable belief that rationality could only be established through a 'top-down' and 'holistic' perspective.

7. The Crisis of the Developmental Model and the 1980 Rupture: From Planning to Liberalization

The developmental state and planning practice, which peaked in the 1960s in Turkey, entered a deep structural crisis at the end of the 1970s under the influence of both internal and external dynamics. This crisis was not merely an economic blockage; it was also a turning point where the state's capacity to manage the economy and plan society was epistemologically questioned.

By the end of the 1970s, the Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy directed at the domestic market—which Turkey had successfully implemented until then—

reached an impasse conceptualized as a 'foreign exchange bottleneck.' The cost shock generated by the oil crises and the unsustainability of foreign trade deficits paralyzed the central planning apparatus's capacity to allocate resources. As Boratav notes, the stagflation experienced during this period caused a dramatic widening of the gap between the state's 'plan-rationality' and market reality (Boratav, 2021). The plan was no longer a guide designing the future; it had transformed into a 'static text' that remained insufficient in managing the ongoing crisis.

The January 24, 1980 Decisions are accepted in the literature not merely as a stabilization package, but as the milestone of Turkey's transition from a developmental state model to a 'regulatory state' model (Öniş, 2004). With these decisions, the state began to withdraw from being an 'agent' that personally constructed and managed the market; instead, it transformed into an actor that adapts to the functioning of the price mechanism. Pamuk defines this process as the dismantling of the state's 'pioneering' role in the economic sphere (Pamuk, 2014). This paradigm shift fundamentally shook the nature of planning; the 'imperative' power of the central plan was pushed into the background against the 'invisible hand' of market forces.

In the post-1980 period, the State Planning Organization's (SPO) identity as a 'pilot agency' within the administrative hierarchy underwent serious erosion. As emphasized in Övgün's analysis, during this period, the understanding of planning moved away from the goal of 'holistic development' and assumed a more 'indicative' character (Övgün, 2010). Plans were no longer strict directives for public institutions; they became flexible texts outlining a macro-economic framework for the private sector. In this process, the SPO evolved from a center of strategic decision-making into a unit where technical data was collected and external debt management was coordinated. This represents the state relinquishing its 'architectural' authority and assuming the role of 'technical consultancy'.

The period between 1980 and the strategic management reforms of the early 2000s is frequently characterized in public administration literature as an era of 'planlessness' or 'administrative void.' While the macro-discipline of the developmental state had been abandoned, a new management logic at the institutional level (such as strategic management) had not yet been substituted in its place. During this process, public administration was managed through short-term crisis management and political populist interventions, devoid of a macro vision. This 'strategic gap' led to a decline in efficiency and the weakening of

institutional capacity within public institutions, ultimately preparing the historical ground that brought strategic planning to the agenda as a 'necessity' in the 2000s.

Consequently, the 1980 rupture transformed planning from being a 'sovereign prerogative' of the state into a 'management technique.' Prior to 1980, planning was a teleological preference regarding where society ought to go; after 1980, it began to turn into an instrumental tool for how to survive in the market. This shift in mindset paved the way for the infiltration of concepts such as 'institutional efficiency' and 'output-orientedness'—which form the basis of strategic planning—into the Turkish bureaucracy. However, this transition also brought with it reflections of the tension between the discipline of the macro-planning tradition and market liberalization that persist to this day.

8. Discussion: Positioning Strategic Management Within the Developmental Legacy

Strategic planning, which was institutionalized in the 2000s as part of public administration reforms in Turkey, was built upon an approximately eighty-year legacy of a 'planning state' rather than emerging in a vacuum. This situation leads to a structural tension between the logic of 'flexible and autonomous management' promised by strategic management and Turkey's hierarchical and centralist 'administrative genetic makeup.' It is possible to discuss the position of strategic management within the developmental legacy through the following analytical dimensions:

In institutional change literature, 'path dependency' is defined as the trajectory of today's reforms being determined by past choices and institutional structures. In the Turkish case, while public institutions prepare strategic plans, they still conduct this process with the logic of 'approving investment programs' from the SPO era. As emphasized by Güler, strategic plans have transformed into 'formal legitimacy texts' used to secure budgetary allocations from the center (Presidency of Strategy and Budget - SBB), rather than serving as management tools (Güler, 2016). Institutions tend to set 'appropriate' goals that will gain the approval of the central authority rather than addressing their internal needs. This situation subordinates the 'institutional rationality' inherent in strategic planning to central budget discipline.

The fundamental assumption of strategic management is that every public unit possesses a 'managerial autonomy' that allows it to design its own future. However, the hierarchical legacy of the developmental state constitutes a significant obstacle to this autonomy. In Turkey, the state is still conceptualized not as a structure composed of parts, but as a 'single and indivisible will.' As Tekeli points out, the 'central reason' stemming from

the macro-planning tradition tends to view the development of unique visions by institutions as an 'administrative drift' (Tekeli, 2010). Consequently, instead of producing strategies specific to themselves, institutions copy the general policy documents of the central government (Development Plans and Medium-Term Programs); this creates a 'strategic isomorphism' at the institutional level.

One of the most fundamental problems of strategic planning in Turkish public administration is the formalism that emerges in the process of 'the transformation of the nature of planning,' as emphasized by Övgün (2010). While plans were imperative documents of social transformation during the developmental era, in the era of strategic management, they have frequently become documents that sit on shelves, disconnected from implementation. 'Planning on paper' is a product of the conflict between the centralist culture's desire to monitor performance and the institutions' lack of autonomy. Institutions engage in 'window dressing' efforts to appear successful to the central authority by defining 'ambitious visions' they cannot achieve; this, in turn, undermines the 'accountability' promise of strategic management.

The fundamental rupture at the center of the discussion lies in the epistemological purpose of planning. While the developmental legacy views planning as a 'teleological' (purpose-oriented) action aiming to transform society and the economy, strategic planning as implemented today is characterized more by a 'procedural' (process-oriented) nature. In the pre-1980 era, the plan was a 'route'; today, for institutions, it serves as an 'administrative checklist.' This situation prevents the deepening of strategic thinking in public administration and transforms planning into a technical bureaucratic burden. The shift from the state's role as an 'architect' to that of an 'operator,' as noted by Pamuk, explains why strategic planning is still experiencing 'transition pains' during this period (Pamuk, 2014).

In conclusion, the future of strategic management in Turkey lies not in the total rejection of the developmental legacy, but in the balance to be established between the 'coordination power' and 'long-term perspective' inherited from that legacy and the 'flexibility' and 'institutional ownership' promised by strategic management. Strategic planning will succeed only to the extent that it is transformed from an instrument of pressure by the centralist genetic makeup into a platform where institutions integrate their own local/technical knowledge into national goals. Otherwise, under the strong shadow of the

developmental state, strategic planning faces the risk of remaining a soulless administrative procedure that offers a 'modern appearance' but lacks substance.

9. Conclusion: From Planning to Strategy, From Strategy to Implementation

Turkey's planning journey is a multi-layered story of transformation, extending from the sectoral construction of the 1930s to the holistic development ideal of the 1960s, the liberalization pains of the 1980s, and the search for strategic management in the 2000s. As presented in this article, the pre-1980 developmental state practice functioned not only as an economic policy but also as an administrative paradigm that reinforced the state's constitutive and guiding role in social modernization. However, the success of this model paradoxically brought its own structural weaknesses: excessive centralization, technocratic elitism, and rigid bureaucratic hierarchy.

The experience of the State Planning Organization (SPO), institutionalized after 1960, endowed Turkey with an immense capacity for data collection, coordination, and macro-decision-making. This era, shaped in accordance with Chalmers Johnson's definition of the 'plan-rational' state, represents a phase where rationality was established 'from the center' and 'top-down.' However, the global and local stalemates of the late 1970s accelerated the epistemological rupture between this central planning rationality and market dynamics. While the post-1980 neo-liberal transformation removed the state from its position as an 'architect' and turned it into an 'operator' or a 'regulatory' actor, planning also evolved from a sovereign prerogative into a management technique.

Strategic planning as implemented in Turkish public administration today remains caught between the 'path dependency' of this historical legacy and the 'flexibility' promise of modern management techniques. The problem of 'formalism' (ritualism) experienced by public institutions in their strategic planning processes is, in fact, a consequence of the structural mismatch between the centralist genetic makeup of the developmental state and the principles of autonomy and result-orientedness inherent in strategic management. Instead of internalizing strategy as a management tool, institutions tend to construct it as a legitimacy document to align with the central authority's budget and approval mechanisms.

The future of Turkish public administration must synthesize the robust 'planning discipline and coordination capacity' of the 1960s with the 'strategic flexibility and institutional autonomy' of the 2000s. Strategic plans that remain only on paper and transform into central directives will be insufficient in overcoming administrative inertia. A genuine transformation

is possible only if the state internalizes its 'new role' in social development—evolving into a structure that not only commands but also facilitates, coordinates, and operates with a focus on performance.

In conclusion, Turkey must reformulate the 'state capacity' provided by its eighty-year planning heritage with a more democratic, participatory, and result-oriented understanding of strategic management, without rejecting that legacy. Strategic management will succeed only to the extent that it can use the institutional discipline provided by the strong shadow of the developmental state as a springboard, rather than fading away under it.

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