AKADEMİK TARİH VE DÜŞÜNCE DERGİSİ
Academic Journal of History and Idea
Research Article

Received: 03.05.2026 **Accepted: 19.09.2026**

Sezgin Elbay* https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0601-8063
Erdoğan Kaya** https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3930-7937

Understanding Three Historical Figures through Historical Empathy: Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Sultan Vahdettin, and Damat Ferit Pasha during the Turkish National Struggle (1919–1922)***

Millî Mücadele Döneminin Üç Tarihî Şahsiyetini Tarihsel Empatiyle Anlamak: Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Sultan Vahdettin ve Damat Ferit Paşa (1919–1922)

Abstract

Studies of the history of the Turkish Republic have generally assessed the Turkish National Struggle through the rise of the Ankara-centred national movement, the dissolution of the Istanbul Government, and the trajectory of military and diplomatic success. Broadening this established framework, the present article examines the political positioning, claims to legitimacy, and approaches to political settlement of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Sultan Vahdettin, and Damat Ferit Pasha between 1919 and 1922 through the framework of historical empathy. It aims to examine the three historical figures' own narratives, their representations of one another, and the ways in which they were assessed by British diplomatic observers within the crisis conditions of the period. To this end, Nutuk, Şahbaba, which contains memoirs and letters attributed to Vahdettin, the memoirs of Kâzım Karabekir and Rıza Nur, and relevant volumes of the 1919–1939 series of Documents on British Foreign Policy were examined through comparative documentary analysis. The analysis suggests that the transfer of power during the Turkish National Struggle did not take place solely between institutions; rather, it unfolded through competing forms of political reasoning shaped by founding action, symbolic waiting, and competing claims to legitimacy. In this respect, the study proposes that historical figures should be examined not solely through retrospective judgements of victory and defeat, but in relation to the possibilities and limitations of their own historical circumstances.

Keywords: *Turkish National Struggle, the threshold of the Republic's foundation, historical empathy, legitimacy, historical figures*

**Ph.D., Lecturer, Rectorate, Department of Atatürk's Principles and History of Revolution, Yalova University, Türkiye, sezgin.elbay@yalova.edu.tr*
*** Prof., Faculty of Education, Department of Social Studies Education, Anadolu University, Türkiye, erkaya@anadolu.edu.tr*

Citation: Elbay, S. & Kaya, E. (2026). Understanding Three Historical Figures through Historical Empathy: Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Sultan Vahdettin, and Damat Ferit Pasha during the Turkish National Struggle (1919–1922). *Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi, 13*(4), 1-20.

****This article is based on a part of the first author's doctoral dissertation, entitled "Investigation of the Effect of the Historical Empathy Model Applied in the Turkish Republic Revolution History and Kemalism Course at Middle School Level on Academic Achievement and Attitude Toward the Course."*

Copyright, License and Responsibility Statement

Copyright in this article remains with the author(s). The authors grant the Academic Journal of History and Idea the right of first publication. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution–NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0). The authors are solely responsible for the scientific, ethical, legal, and factual content of the article. The views expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect those of the journal, the Editor-in-Chief, the editors, or the Editorial Board.

Öz

Cumhuriyet tarihi ile ilgili çalışmalarda Millî Mücadele, çoğunlukla Ankara merkezli millî hareketin yükselişi, İstanbul Hükûmeti'nin çözülüşü ve askerî-diplomatik başarı çizgisi üzerinden değerlendirilmiştir. Bu makale, söz konusu yerleşik çerçeveyi genişleterek 1919–1922 yılları arasında Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Sultan Vahdettin ve Damat Ferit Paşa'nın siyasi konumlanışlarını, meşruiyet iddialarını ve çözüm arayışlarını tarihsel empati temelinde incelemektedir. Amaç, üç tarihî şahsiyetin kendi anlatılarını, birbirlerini nasıl temsil ettiklerini ve İngiliz diplomatik gözlemcileri tarafından nasıl değerlendirildiklerini dönemin kriz şartları içinde incelemektir. Bu doğrultuda Nutuk, Vahdettin'e ait hatırat ve mektupları içeren Şahbaba, Kâzım Karabekir ve Rıza Nur'un hatıratları ile İngiliz Dış Politikası Belgeleri'nin 1919–1939 serisine ait ilgili ciltler karşılaştırmalı belge analiziyle incelenmiştir. İnceleme, Millî Mücadele sırasında iktidar transferinin yalnızca kurumlar arasında gerçekleşmediğini; bunun yerine kurucu eylem, sembolik bekleyiş ve rekabet hâlindeki meşruiyet iddialarının şekillendirdiği farklı siyasal düşünme biçimleri üzerinden geliştiğini göstermektedir. Bu doğrultuda çalışma, tarihî şahsiyetlerin yalnızca sonradan kesinleşen zafer ve yenilgi hükümleri üzerinden değil, kendi tarihsel koşullarının sunduğu imkânlar ve getirdiği sınırlılıklar çerçevesinde incelenmesini önermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Millî Mücadele, Cumhuriyet'in kuruluş eşiği, tarihsel empati, meşruiyet, tarihî şahsiyetler*

Introduction

The years of the Turkish National Struggle constituted not merely a transitional period marked by successive military and diplomatic phases, but a multilayered historical process in which legitimacy, representative authority, and possible paths to political settlement were redefined between the last centers of Ottoman political authority and the national movement taking shape in Anatolia. The political positions of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Sultan Vahdettin and Damat Ferit Pasha were formed within this contested field of authority. Their decisions therefore need to be examined in relation to the information available to them at the time, the constraints they perceived and the competing grounds on which they claimed political legitimacy.

An extensive body of scholarship has already established the political and diplomatic framework of the Turkish National Struggle. Jaeschke's (2001) collection of British documents and Şimşir's (2006) multi-volume edition made British official assessments of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Anatolian movement widely available to Turkish historiography, while Baytok (2007) traced Allied deliberations over the peace settlement from Sèvres to Lausanne through British records. Sonyel (2007) combined British official material with Turkish sources in a study centred on Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Sultan Vahdettin and the War of Independence, making his work the closest precedent to the source base and principal figures examined here. Akşin (2010) reconstructed the policies of the Istanbul governments and their changing relationship with the national movement, whereas Akandere and Polat (2025) examined the anti-National Struggle policies of the Damat Ferit Pasha governments in detail. Dönmez (1999) analysed the organisation, ideology and activities of the Society of Friends of England, while Tunaya (2002, 2007) and Berkes (2002) situated the conflict between Istanbul and Ankara within broader processes of political transformation and modernisation. More recent studies have further clarified particular fields of representation. Elmacı (2025) examines representations of Mustafa Kemal

Pasha and the National Struggle in the Istanbul press, while Güven (2019) and Yılmaz (2020) analyse their representation in the British press; Özcan (2023) and Yenen (2018) focus more specifically on British official and intelligence perceptions. Studies of Sultan Vahdettin concentrate on his policy towards Britain, his contacts with the British High Commission and his eventual departure under British protection (Çelik, 2016; Kıbıl, 2019; Köylü, 2023; Okur, 2010). Research on Damat Ferit Pasha, in turn, primarily addresses governmental propaganda, accusations of Unionism and Bolshevism, and organised opposition to the National Struggle (Akandere & Polat, 2025; Güçer, 2024; Semiz & Aslan, 2019). Taken together, this scholarship demonstrates that neither the three historical figures nor the British evidence used in the present article constitute an unexplored field.

The present article therefore makes no claim to introduce previously unpublished British documents or previously unused memoirs. Its contribution is analytical rather than documentary: it applies the same comparative questions to three differently documented political positions—what each historical figure understood as legitimate authority, which political alternatives he regarded as viable, and how his position was represented by supporters, opponents and British observers. It accordingly brings British diplomatic reports, Nutuk and selected memoir narratives into a comparative historical-empathy framework. Historical empathy is understood here as the evidence-based reconstruction of historical perspectives within the uncertainties, knowledge and constraints of the period, without equating contextual understanding with sympathy, moral approval or the equalisation of political responsibility (Endacott & Brooks, 2013; Karn, 2023). The surviving source base is asymmetrical. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's retrospective self-representation is directly available in Nutuk, while statements and letters attributed to Sultan Vahdettin are preserved in Şahbaba and related sources. Damat Ferit Pasha's position, however, must be reconstructed primarily from statements reported in British diplomatic records and from contemporary or retrospective counter-narratives. The comparison therefore concerns differently mediated historical perspectives rather than three equivalent bodies of personal testimony. Accordingly, the article seeks neither to rewrite the established chronology nor to equalise the political consequences and responsibilities of the three actors; it aims to explain how different perceptions of legitimacy, authority and political possibility shaped their responses to the same historical crisis. Methodologically, the study combines comparative source criticism with a historical-empathy framework. It reads contemporaneous diplomatic and parliamentary records alongside retrospective political and memoir narratives, taking into account their provenance, purpose, temporal distance and the asymmetrical survival of evidence concerning the three historical figures.

Historical Background: From Ottoman Defeat to the Landing at Samsun

By the autumn of 1918, the Ottoman Empire had reached the end of the First World War after four years of military mobilisation, territorial losses, economic exhaustion and demographic disruption. Signed on 30 October 1918, the Armistice of Mudros required the demobilisation of Ottoman forces and gave the Allied Powers broad scope to control strategic communications and occupy locations they deemed necessary for their security. The arrival of the Allied fleet in Istanbul on 13 November 1918, followed by the stationing of Allied forces at strategic points in the capital, demonstrated that the Ottoman government would henceforth operate under direct military and diplomatic pressure. The armistice thus marked not only the end of hostilities but also the beginning of a struggle over the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political survival of the Ottoman State (Akşin, 2010; Gökbilgin, 1959; Jaeschke, 2001).

During the months following the armistice, Allied occupations expanded across Ottoman territories, including several regions of Anatolia. British, French and Italian forces established control over strategically important areas, while the Greek landing at Izmir on 15 May 1919 intensified public protests and local efforts to organise resistance. In Istanbul, Sultan Vahdettin and the successive Ottoman governments attempted to preserve the remaining authority of the state and dynasty through negotiations with the Allied Powers. Following his appointment as grand vizier on 4 March 1919, Damat Ferit Pasha pursued a policy that attached particular importance to cooperation with Britain, efforts to secure less severe peace terms and the removal from public life of what his government regarded as continuing Unionist influence (Akşin, 2010; Küçük, 1993; Sonyel, 2007). These developments formed the immediate political and military context of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's departure for Anatolia.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha returned to Istanbul on 13 November 1918 following the dissolution of the Yıldırım Army Group. In response to problems concerning demobilisation, the collection of arms and public order in the Black Sea region, the Ottoman government appointed him Inspector of the Ninth Army Troops (Dokuzuncu Ordu Kıtaatı Müfettişi) on 30 April 1919, with the appointment being approved by Sultan Vahdettin. His official instructions authorised him to restore order, supervise military units and communicate with civil authorities across a broad area. Mustafa Kemal Pasha departed from Istanbul on 16 May, the day after Greek forces landed in Izmir, and arrived at Samsun on 19 May 1919. The appointment should not be read teleologically, either as evidence of a pre-existing government plan to launch national resistance or solely as a mandate to suppress resistance. Its political significance emerged from the way Mustafa Kemal Pasha used the powers of the inspectorate after

reaching Anatolia (Erdoğan, 2024; Gökbilgin, 1959; Türkmen, 2001). Mustafa Kemal Pasha's landing at Samsun thus constitutes the chronological boundary between the contextual background outlined here and the contest over authority and legitimacy examined in the remainder of the article. Before turning to that comparison, the following section defines the source base of the study and the source-critical principles on which the analysis rests.

Sources, Method, and Source Criticism

This study employs a comparative historical design to examine the understandings of authority, claims to legitimacy and perceived political alternatives associated with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Sultan Vahdettin and Damat Ferit Pasha. Its source corpus comprises four categories: Mustafa Kemal Pasha's retrospective account in Nutuk and his contemporaneous speeches, circulars and telegrams; statements and letters attributed to Sultan Vahdettin; supplementary memoir and parliamentary testimony; and British diplomatic records. Sources were selected purposively according to their direct relevance to the research questions rather than as an exhaustive collection of all available material. The chronological scope is not identical for all three historical figures. Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Sultan Vahdettin remained active holders of political authority until 1922, whereas Damat Ferit Pasha's direct governmental agency ended with his resignation on 17 October 1920. The surviving evidence is also asymmetrical: Mustafa Kemal Pasha left an extensive retrospective and contemporaneous corpus, while no equivalent body of first-person testimony survives for Damat Ferit Pasha. His position is therefore reconstructed primarily from statements reported in British records, the policies of his governments and retrospective accounts written by his opponents.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha's position is reconstructed through both retrospective and contemporaneous sources. Nutuk was delivered at the Republican People's Party Congress on 15–20 October 1927 and subsequently published together with a documentary appendix. In this study, it is classified neither as an ordinary memoir nor as a neutral scholarly monograph. It is treated as a document-supported political speech and a retrospective first-person account through which Mustafa Kemal Pasha selected, arranged and interpreted the events of 1919–1927. The main text of Nutuk is cited from the unsimplified Kaynak Yayınları edition (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015), while its documentary appendix is cited from Volume III, Vesikalar, published by the Turkish Institute of the History of the Revolution (Atatürk, 1973). The appendix is used not as an extension of the 1927 retrospective narrative but as a collection of contemporaneous documents—particularly the Amasya Circular of 22 June 1919 and the commanders' joint communication to the Sultan of 11 September 1919—against which that narrative can be tested (Atatürk, 1973). To distinguish Mustafa Kemal

Pasha's retrospective construction in 1927 from his public language during the National Struggle, these documents are read alongside his address to the Grand National Assembly on 24 April 1920 (Atatürk, 2024) and Karabekir's parliamentary interventions of 30 October 1922, as recorded in the proceedings of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi [TBMM], 1922/1960). This comparison makes it possible to determine both the continuities and the changes between his contemporaneous political language and his later account of the founding process (Gürkan, 2013).

The records attributed to Sultan Vahdettin in Murat Bardakçı's Şahbaba are used only to reconstruct the sultan's retrospective self-representation. They provide evidence of how Vahdettin explained his conduct through defeat, restricted room for manoeuvre, the preservation of Istanbul and the dynasty, and attempts to mitigate the terms imposed by the victorious powers. They are not treated as sufficient evidence of what his policies objectively achieved or of the full decision-making process of the palace and the Istanbul governments. Bardakçı's editorial interpretations are therefore separated from the statements, letters and memoir fragments attributed directly to Vahdettin. These materials are cross-checked against British diplomatic records and the findings of studies based on official documents. The works of Akşin (2010), Sonyel (2007) and Özakman (1997), together with studies of Vahdettin's relations with the British High Commission, are used as historiographical positions against which the claims made in Şahbaba are tested rather than as substitutes for primary evidence (Okur, 2010; Kıbıl, 2019; Köylü, 2023).

Kâzım Karabekir's writings and Rıza Nur's memoirs are used as supplementary rather than representative accounts. Karabekir's works make it possible to test Mustafa Kemal Pasha's retrospective account in Nutuk against another participant's claims concerning the emergence of Anatolia-centred resistance, the exchange of views among commanders and precedence in recognising the threat to national independence. They are not treated as representative of all members of the military-political leadership of the National Struggle. Karabekir's parliamentary interventions of 30 October 1922 are also used as a contemporaneous check on his later memoir narrative (TBMM, 1922/1960). Rıza Nur's highly polemical account has a still narrower function: it is used only to demonstrate how Damat Ferit Pasha and the Liberty and Entente circles were represented within hostile political memory. Since it does not provide an independent body of evidence concerning Damat Ferit's decision-making, it is not treated as a separate or equivalent source group.

The relevant volumes of Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939 provide the principal body of contemporaneous external evidence. These records are official diplomatic and intelligence texts produced within the strategic priorities of the British state; they are therefore not treated as a

neutral external reality. Their value lies in revealing the categories through which British officials interpreted Ottoman legal authority, Ankara's developing de facto power, military capacity, Bolshevism, Unionism and the availability of political interlocutors. Changes in the language applied to Mustafa Kemal Pasha between 1919 and 1922 are interpreted together with changes in the military balance and the diplomatic necessity of negotiating with Ankara. The documents used here have previously been published and examined by Jaeschke (2001), Şimşir (2006), Sonyel (2007), Baytok (2007) and other researchers. The article therefore makes no claim to have discovered previously unknown British documents. Its contribution lies in applying a common set of comparative questions to British assessments, retrospective self-representations and contemporaneous political statements concerning the three historical figures.

Source criticism proceeded through four related operations: identifying the genre, provenance and political purpose of each source; distinguishing contemporaneous statements from retrospective narratives; cross-checking claims across independent source types; and taking account of temporal and evidential asymmetry. Historical empathy was used as an interpretive framework for reconstructing what the actors knew, feared, expected and regarded as politically possible within their own circumstances. It was not used to suspend evidence-based judgement or to equalise political responsibility. The comparison accordingly asks the same questions of differently mediated positions: what constituted legitimate authority for each historical figure, which political alternatives he regarded as viable, how he interpreted external pressure and how his position was represented by supporters, opponents and British observers (Endacott & Brooks, 2013; Karn, 2023). In this article, legitimacy is used in an analytical rather than a normative or transhistorical sense. The unit of analysis is neither a complete political biography of each figure nor a judgement about which actor embodied an assumed timeless Turkish state tradition. It is the evidence-based reconstruction of the sources of authority that each actor invoked, the alternatives he considered viable, and the ways in which those claims were institutionalised, contested, and recognised between 1919 and 1922.

Legitimacy, Waiting, and Counter-Legitimacy in the Turkish National Struggle: Analysing Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Sultan Vahdettin, and Damat Ferit Pasha through Historical Empathy

Mustafa Kemal Pasha: National Sovereignty and the Construction of Founding Authority

If the 1919–1922 phase of the Turkish National Struggle is read merely as a sequence of military advance or diplomatic negotiation, the historical roles of Mustafa Kemal, Vahdettin, and Damat Ferit

Pasha become confined within fixed categories. Yet the available documents show that, on the same historical ground, there existed three distinct fears, three distinct visions of salvation, and three distinct claims to legitimacy. In Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal situates this multilayered crisis, from the very moment of his landing at Samsun, within a scene of collapse: "*I landed at Samsun on 19 May 1919. The general situation and outlook were as follows: the group to which the Ottoman State belonged had been defeated in the Great War; the Ottoman army had been battered on all fronts; an armistice with severe terms had been signed. During the long years of the Great War, the nation had become weary and impoverished*." (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 31). This opening shows that Mustafa Kemal constructed his own point of departure within defeat, poverty, military disarray, and a crisis of central authority. British documents captured the same terrain through a different conceptualization; in the summer of 1919, according to Calthorpe, the Turkish political field was divided into two camps: those who hoped for something from the Allied Powers, especially Britain, and those who believed that the time for resistance had come (Calthorpe, 1919/1952). When these two records are read together, the crisis does not remain merely an external pressure produced by occupation; it becomes a threshold at which strategies of waiting, accommodation, and resistance within the country diverged from one another.

In Mustafa Kemal's self-narrative, this threshold is crossed through a transition from the effort to repair old institutions to the idea of founding a new political order. In his view, "*the Ottoman State, its independence, the sultan, the caliph, and the government*" had become "*nothing but a number of meaningless words that had lost their significance*"; therefore, "*there was only one decision. That was to establish a new Turkish state, unconditionally independent and based on national sovereignty.*" (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 38). Here, Mustafa Kemal does not present himself merely as a commander responding to an existing crisis; he positions himself as the bearer of a founding decision that transcended the old language of legitimacy. He grounds the moral basis of this decision in the relationship between the dignity of the nation and complete independence: "*The essential principle is that the Turkish nation should live as an honorable and dignified nation. This principle can be secured only by possessing complete independence*." (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 38). This idea becomes, in the formula "*independence or death*," not only an expression of military resolve but also a form of political ontology (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 39). What is striking in Mustafa Kemal's account of his own leadership is his strategy of not immediately disclosing this radical rupture. In Nutuk, he states that it was necessary "*to divide implementation into a number of stages," "to prepare the feelings and ideas of the nation*," and to proceed towards the objective "*step by step*." (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 39). Thus, in his historical perspective, independence did not remain an abstract ideal declared all at once; rather, the psychology of society, military possibilities, the timing of the break with central

authority, and the organisation of Anatolia were calculated progressively. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's contemporaneous statements both support and qualify the retrospective continuity constructed in Nutuk. The documentary appendix to Nutuk reproduces the Amasya Circular of 22 June 1919 as Document 26. The circular stated that the central government was unable to fulfil its responsibilities and that the nation's independence would be secured by "*the determination and decision of the nation*" (Atatürk, 1973, pp. 915–916). Because this document was issued in 1919, it provides contemporaneous evidence for the emerging language of national agency rather than merely reproducing Mustafa Kemal Pasha's retrospective interpretation of that language in 1927. Yet, in his address to the Grand National Assembly on 24 April 1920, Mustafa Kemal Pasha still stated that the Assembly's national power would rescue the sultanate and caliphate from foreign pressure (Atatürk, 2024).

Karabekir's records offer a distinct perspective that both supports Mustafa Kemal's self-narrative and adds his own claim of precedence. Karabekir formulates the central question of the War of Independence as follows: "*Who saw, and when, that our national independence was moving into danger, and what initiatives did they undertake?*" (Karabekir, 1951, p. 19). He then emphasizes that there were "*various points of view*" on how independence was to be saved (Karabekir, 1951, p. 19). In this way, he constructs his own account not as a single-line narrative of victory, but as a comparison of different strategies of salvation. His formulation of "*Anatolian Turkish nationalism*," which he presents as an earlier historical intuition, is also significant in this respect: "*In Europe, Thrace, and in Asia, the territory within our Anatolian national frontiers is the homeland of us Turks.*" (Karabekir, 2011, p. 146). This statement shows that, in Karabekir's mind, the transition from an imperial geography to the idea of a core homeland had already been prepared before 1919. The words he reports from his meeting with Mustafa Kemal in 1919—"*The situation proves you right. Once I recover, I shall try to come*"—provide a further testimony indicating that the idea of Anatolia-centred resistance developed through discussion and agreement among commanders (Karabekir, 1951, p. 44). Karabekir's two parliamentary interventions on 30 October 1922 provide a contemporaneous point of comparison with his later memoir narrative. In his first address, he placed military victory within the national unity represented by the Grand National Assembly and emphasised the army's respect and obedience towards it (TBMM, 1922/1960). In the subsequent debate on Tevfik Pasha's telegram, he opposed the Istanbul Government's attempt to appear alongside Ankara at the peace conference and recalled Damat Ferit's efforts to undermine his command (TBMM, 1922/1960). Although he did not personally demand the abolition of the sultanate in that speech, his name appeared among the signatories of the proposal declaring that sovereignty had passed to the nation and that the sultanate in Istanbul had become void and passed into history

(TBMM, 1922/1960). These contemporaneous records do not require Karabekir's memoir to be discarded; rather, they require its later claim of precedence not to be projected backwards as evidence of a wartime contest for supreme leadership.

Mustafa Kemal's view of Vahdettin and Damat Ferit constitutes the sharpest part of the struggle over legitimacy. In Nutuk, Vahdettin is portrayed as a sultan seeking measures through which he imagined he could secure "*his own person and only his throne*," while the Damat Ferit cabinet is depicted as an "*incapable, dishonorable, cowardly*" government "*subject only to the will of the Sultan*." (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 31). In the same narrative, Vahdettin, who bore the title of "*Ottoman sultan and caliph of the face of the earth*," together with Damat Ferit Pasha and his circle, is placed at the head of the Society of the Friends of England (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 34). This representation does not merely locate the Vahdettin–Damat Ferit line, in Mustafa Kemal's eyes, within a passive strategy of waiting; it associates it with British protection, internal provocation, and the ground of foreign intervention. For in Nutuk, the open face of this circle is defined as the pursuit of "*requesting and securing British protection*," while its hidden aspect is described as "*paralyzing national consciousness*" and facilitating foreign intervention (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 35). For this reason, Mustafa Kemal's criticism of Damat Ferit is analysed here as a political and institutional challenge to the basis of the Istanbul Government's authority, not as evidence of personal animosity. By tying the right to "*speak internally and externally on the destiny of the homeland and the nation*" to reliance on "*the national will*," his argument called into question the legitimacy of the Istanbul Government (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 78). Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal's tactic was not founded on making Vahdettin an explicit target at every stage. In the context of the Ali Galip affair, while stating that there was "*a joint enterprise of the Sultan, the Ferit Pasha government, and foreigners*," (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 124) he also explains the political method pursued: "*We, too, identified only the Ferit Pasha cabinet as the target of attack and pretended not to know that the Sultan was involved. We maintained the thesis that the Ferit Pasha cabinet was deceiving the Sultan by not informing him of the truth*." (Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015, p. 124). The documentary appendix confirms that this distinction was present in the political language of 1919 and was not solely a retrospective rationalisation constructed in 1927. In the commanders' joint communication addressed to the Sultan on 11 September 1919, the central government was declared to have lost the nation's confidence, the formation of a new cabinet composed of honourable persons loyal to the constitutional order was requested, and reverence for the sultanate and caliphate was simultaneously affirmed (Atatürk, 1973). As a petition addressed to the Sultan, however, the document reveals the movement's public and strategic positioning; it cannot by itself establish the commanders' private judgements concerning Vahdettin's responsibility. This

passage is highly valuable from the standpoint of historical perspective-taking. Mustafa Kemal's judgement was that Vahdettin was involved in the process; yet the political technique of the period avoided placing the sultan directly on the opposing front by directing the struggle first against the Damat Ferit cabinet. This shows that, in the early phase of the Turkish National Struggle, legitimacy was not established by military force alone, but also through symbolic authority, public opinion, and timing.

Sultan Vahdettin: Dynastic Survival, Waiting, and Damage Limitation

Vahdettin's authority was dynastic and constitutional in form, but it operated under military defeat, the dissolution of parliament, and Allied occupation. It is therefore inaccurate to describe it simply as an unqualified absolute monarchy. The constitutional amendments of 1909 had restricted the sultan's legislative influence and power of dissolution and had moved the Ottoman constitutional order towards a parliamentary model; nevertheless, the exceptional conditions of 1918–1920 increased the palace's practical political weight. Vahdettin's own perspective, by contrast, narrates the same period through a markedly different language of pressure and helplessness. In the memoir fragments transmitted in Şahbaba, the sultan presents himself as having inherited, upon his accession, a chain of disasters produced by the war: "*After the armistice, we were compelled to confront all at once the totality of the difficulties and errors accumulated over the four years of the World War.*" (Bardakçı, 2006, p. 46). Within this framework, the existence of the state and the status of Istanbul constituted his principal concerns: "*For a time, the very existence of the state was in danger, and the question of Istanbul remained unresolved.*" (Bardakçı, 2006, p. 46). Vahdettin also presents his field of action as severely limited: "*Nor did we possess a personal, independent policy of our own.*" (Bardakçı, 2006, p. 46). These statements indicate that he positioned himself not as an absolute decision-maker, but as a ruler trapped between constitutional constraints, governments, the pressure of occupation, and the will of the victorious powers. Thus, against Mustafa Kemal's emphasis in Nutuk on the personal security of the throne, Vahdettin's self-defence foregrounds the preservation of the state's existence, the retention of Istanbul, and the mitigation of the severity of the victors.

Vahdettin's foreign-policy reasoning lies at the centre of this defence. He counts himself among those who regarded "*the policy towards the Entente Powers inherited from my father before the World War*" (Bardakçı, 2006, p. 46) as a basis of salvation; after defeat, he states that he sought to "*mitigate the hostility, anger, and severity*" (Bardakçı, 2006, p. 47) of the British and the French. This line may be read as a politics of damage limitation, the revival of an older memory of alignment, and the appeasement of victorious powers rather than one of active resistance. Vahdettin's statement that "*the British occupied*

the position of masters of policy at the armistice" (Bardakçı, 2006, p. 47) clearly reveals the reading of power that underlay this strategy. His account of Sèvres rests on the same logic of gaining time. He states that when he received the Treaty of Sèvres, he felt "*a sharp pain and a fearful shudder*," regarded the text as "*evil itself from beginning to end*," and, from his own standpoint, sought "*to gain some time through a compulsory and provisional tactic of signature*." (Bardakçı, 2006, p. 167). Through the Mecca declaration, he even attempts to limit his legal responsibility by stating, "*I did not ratify the Treaty of Sèvres in such a way that it could be deemed to have acquired finality*." (Bardakçı, 2006, p. 168). This perspective presents Vahdettin as an actor seeking accommodation with the British, while also showing that he justified his own action not as surrender, but as a politics of delay and damage limitation. Vahdettin's retrospective defence must be tested against contemporaneous British reporting. Following his audience of 11 October 1920, de Robeck recorded that the Sultan spoke of abdication in the event of a Nationalist government coming to power, insisted that a change of cabinet would eventually produce the same result, and was principally concerned with his position after abdication (de Robeck, 1920c/1963). This report supports the importance of political constraint and dynastic survival within Vahdettin's reasoning, but it also demonstrates that the composition of the Istanbul government remained part of his active political calculation. Since the account was produced within British diplomatic priorities, it cannot by itself prove either the necessity of Vahdettin's choices or the absence of alternatives. Historical empathy therefore reconstructs the reasoning generated by defeat and occupation without converting either retrospective self-justification or British observation into exoneration.

Damat Ferit Pasha: Counter-Legitimacy and Miscalculated External Support, 1919–1920

Within this multiplicity of perspectives, Damat Ferit Pasha is the figure who appears most often through the language of others. At this point, a chronological distinction is necessary. Damat Ferit Pasha's direct role as a governmental decision-maker was limited to his periods as grand vizier and ended on 17 October 1920. The evidence concerning him is therefore evaluated primarily within the political conditions of 1919–1920. References dating from 1921–1922 are not treated as evidence of continuing executive agency but as indications of the subsequent representation and political legacy of the policies pursued by his governments (Akandere & Polat, 2025; Küçük, 1993). In Mustafa Kemal's narrative, Damat Ferit is a centre of counter-legitimacy that does not rest on the national will and is associated with the pursuit of foreign-backed coercion. British documents, however, present Ferit less as a powerful political centre in his own right than as a weak grand vizier prone to miscalculation. The statement in a British report dated 1 August 1919 that "*Ferid Pasha is perplexed and easily deceived*" reveals that the British did not regard him as a fully reliable executive force (Calthorpe, 1919/1952, p. 713).

De Robeck and the French High Commissioner judged that sending troops against the Nationalists could only lead to civil war or, alternatively, to those troops joining Mustafa Kemal (de Robeck, 1919a/1952). Thus, the British view regarded Damat Ferit's plan of harsh suppression as a move with weak prospects of implementation and one capable of producing the opposite of its intended result.

Ferit Pasha's own political perception appears more clearly in British records in 1920. In a document dated 17 July 1920, Ferit Pasha interpreted the Kemalists' inability to resist the Greek advance as evidence of "*how little hold they had*" and of the peasants' readiness to accept "*peace, from wherever it might come*." (de Robeck, 1920a/1963, p. 102). In the same meeting, he further claimed that, if the Greeks were ordered to advance "*to Angora, and even to Sivas*," this would amount to "*a military promenade*." (de Robeck, 1920a/1963, p. 102). These two statements reveal Damat Ferit's historical miscalculation: he regarded the Ankara movement as militarily fragile, limited in popular support, and liable to disintegrate under external pressure. The more personal and polemical language directed at Damat Ferit in Rıza Nur's memoirs complements the perception of this politically excluded circle; after stating that "*Ferit Pasha and these men revived the Liberty and Entente Party; the government was in their hands*," Rıza Nur situates Ferit's circle within the context of occupation by adding that "*they were assisting the Entente Powers in these occupations*." (Nur, 1967, p. 488). These records show that Ferit was not merely a figure accused in Mustafa Kemal's narrative; across the worlds of memoir-writing and British documentation, he was also viewed as a controversial actor in terms of capacity, intention, and political orientation. Contemporaneous evidence also shows how Ferit Pasha related political survival to British support. On 4 October 1920, de Robeck reported that, following consultations with the Sultan, Ferit stated that Vahdettin might abdicate rather than work with a government of Nationalist leanings. The report expressly questioned whether Ferit was exaggerating the Sultan's dependence on him and recorded that Ferit had asked whether Britain would assist them if his resignation and the Sultan's abdication forced them to leave the country (de Robeck, 1920b/1963). This evidence is more useful than a general allegation of collaboration: it records Ferit's reported political calculation while preserving the British observer's doubt concerning his self-presentation.

The cross-reading of Nutuk, Vahdettin's retrospective defence and British diplomatic records does not make any one of these accounts sufficient on its own. British records support Mustafa Kemal Pasha's criticism that Istanbul-centred policies depended heavily on accommodation with Britain, while also showing that British officials distinguished between Sultan Vahdettin's symbolic legal authority and Damat Ferit Pasha's practical usefulness as a governmental channel. At the same time, Vahdettin's retrospective language of constraint and damage limitation cannot by itself remove his

responsibility for the policies pursued in his name. The principal analytical result is therefore that the Istanbul-centred position was institutionally connected but internally differentiated. Damat Ferit Pasha derived his authority from the Sultan and acted within the palace–government relationship; the evidence does not establish an autonomous policy pursued against Vahdettin's will. Within this common axis, however, the sources permit a distinction between Vahdettin's dynastic position and Damat Ferit's executive role in pursuing counter-mobilisation and Allied pressure on the basis of an erroneous assessment of Ankara's military and social capacity (de Robeck, 1920a/1963; de Robeck, 1920b/1963).

British Reclassification: From Ottoman Legal Authority to Ankara's De Facto Power

British assessments of Mustafa Kemal and the Anatolian movement changed progressively rather than at a single moment. In 1919, de Robeck attributed the emergence of the movement to the occupation of İzmir, observing that *"the Nationalist movement has been produced by the occupation of Smyrna, and its essential object is to bring that occupation to an end."* (de Robeck, 1919b/1952, p. 765). In the same report, the movement was described as *"the direct continuation of the Committee of Union and Progress."* (de Robeck, 1919b/1952, p. 763). By March 1920, however, a British General Staff memorandum recorded that *"political power has passed to the Nationalists"* and treated their organisation as capable of functioning independently. The memorandum also distinguished widespread war-weariness from continued resistance to the transfer of territory to Greece or Armenia and associated the movement's strength with fears of permanent occupation (British General Staff, 1920/1963). British reclassification was therefore already under way before 1921, as territorial threat, popular mobilisation and Ankara's growing administrative capacity increasingly had to be taken into account.

By January 1921, this shift was expressed in more categorical terms. Rumbold stated that *"It is useless to regard Mustapha Kemal any longer as a brigand chief"* and that the *"Angora Government has tight grip on the whole of Asia Minor not in effective foreign occupation"* (Rumbold, 1921/1970, p. 21). The significance of this assessment lay in the distinction between de facto authority in Anatolia and the legal-symbolic position still attributed to the Sultan in Istanbul. Rumbold nevertheless envisaged the possibility of *"gradually building up from Constantinople a new position with Sultan as corner stone"* (Rumbold, 1921/1970, p. 23). The report therefore registered Ankara as an established governmental force without abandoning the possibility that the Sultan might still serve as the institutional basis of an alternative political settlement.

By 1922, in the eyes of British documents, Mustafa Kemal had ceased to be merely the leader conducting resistance in Anatolia and had become an actor compelling the Allies to negotiate. During

the days of the Great Offensive, according to Rumbold, the Nationalists had "*decided to settle matters by force of arms*" because they regarded the Greek declaration of an autonomous zone in Anatolia and Lloyd George's speech as signs of revision against Turkey (Rumbold, 1922a/1972, pp. 2–3). The same Rumbold recorded that Britain's "*purely moral influence*" over the Kemalists was "*nil*." (Rumbold, 1922b/1972, p. 6). This indicates that Ankara was no longer a local centre of opposition that could be directed by external counsel. A document dated 7 September 1922 stated that the Kemalists would either "*reject*" Allied intervention or use it "*to secure Allied approval for their own proposals*." (Rumbold, 1922c/1972, pp. 12–13). Thus, in British documents, Mustafa Kemal appears in 1919 as the leader of a movement produced by occupation, in 1921 as the head of a de facto government, and in 1922 as the actor who transformed military victory into a diplomatic programme.

The comparison yields three findings that do not emerge from any one source group in isolation. First, Nutuk retrospectively presents the foundation of a new state as the organising decision of 1919, whereas Mustafa Kemal Pasha's public language in 1919–1920 continued to incorporate the liberation of the sultanate and caliphate. Founding intention and the public language of legitimacy were therefore related but not identical (Atatürk, 1997; Gazi Mustafa Kemal, 2015). Second, Vahdettin's retrospective language of constraint becomes intelligible under the conditions of defeat and occupation, but British reports show that he continued to seek Allied assistance and the restoration of obedience to Istanbul. Historical constraint therefore restricted but did not eliminate his agency. Third, the British transition from representing Mustafa Kemal as a disruptive or brigand leader to recognising Ankara as an unavoidable de facto authority reflected a transformation in the distribution of power rather than British acceptance of Ankara's normative claims (de Robeck, 1919b/1952; Rumbold, 1921/1970; Rumbold, 1922a/1972). Damat Ferit's miscalculation lay at the intersection of these developments: he treated Allied leverage as a substitute for domestic representative capacity and failed to recognise that political legitimacy was moving from inherited legal status towards organised national sovereignty (de Robeck, 1920a/1963). Historical empathy does not equalise these political projects or their consequences; it reconstructs the evidence-based reasoning, constraints, and errors through which their unequal historical outcomes emerged.

Conclusion

The comparison reveals divergent temporal expectations within unequal institutional positions and non-identical chronological spans. Mustafa Kemal Pasha linked preparation and gradual organisation to the construction of an Assembly-centred political order based on national sovereignty. Sultan Vahdettin sought to preserve dynastic and governmental continuity by gaining time and limiting

losses under Allied pressure. During his periods as grand vizier, Damat Ferit Pasha operated within this palace–government axis and expected that Ankara could be weakened through Allied support and external military pressure. These differences are therefore treated as evidence-based variations in political calculation, institutional role and chosen instruments, rather than as three autonomous political projects or unverifiable differences in personal mentality. This interpretation moves beyond moral binaries of courage and fear or loyalty and betrayal without treating the actors' political projects and consequences as equivalent.

The relationship between Vahdettin and Damat Ferit therefore requires both institutional connection and analytical differentiation. Damat Ferit's authority derived from his appointment by the Sultan, and the policies of his cabinets cannot be detached from the palace–government relationship. The evidence examined here does not establish that he formulated or implemented a sovereign policy against Vahdettin's will. At the same time, institutional dependence does not make the two historical figures analytically identical: British reports record Ferit's own assessments of Ankara's weakness and his requests for British assistance, while also showing that he acted after consultation with the Sultan (de Robeck, 1920a/1963; de Robeck, 1920b/1963). The distinction is consequently between Vahdettin's dynastic and constitutional position and Damat Ferit's executive role within the same Istanbul-centred axis, not between two independent or opposing centres of authority.

Chronology also limits the comparison. Damat Ferit Pasha's direct governmental agency ended with his resignation on 17 October 1920; evidence from 1921–1922 is used only to trace the subsequent representation and political legacy of his governments, not continuing decision-making. Thereafter, the operative conflict increasingly lay between Ankara's expanding de facto governmental authority and the continuing legal and symbolic authority of the Sultan and successive Istanbul governments. British documents register this redistribution of power by moving from descriptions of Mustafa Kemal as a disruptive leader towards recognition of Ankara as an unavoidable governmental and diplomatic interlocutor, even while the Sultan continued to be considered as a possible basis for an Istanbul-centred settlement (Rumbold, 1921/1970). The study's principal conclusion is therefore not that three autonomous political rationalities competed unchanged until 1922, but that the palace–government strategy associated with Damat Ferit's cabinets shaped the counter-policy of 1919–1920, whereas after October 1920 the decisive political relationship increasingly became that between Ankara and the Sultan-centred Istanbul order.

Author Contributions

Sezgin Elbay contributed to the conceptualization and methodological design of the study, analysis and interpretation of the sources, and preparation of the manuscript. Erdoğan Kaya contributed to the analysis and interpretation of the findings, critical revision of the manuscript, and development of the final version. Both authors critically reviewed the manuscript, approved the final version, and agreed to be accountable for all aspects of the work.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest related to the research, authorship, or publication of this article.

References

Akandere, O. & Polat, H. A. (2025). Damat Ferit Paşa hükümetlerinin Millî Mücadele karşıtı politikaları. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi.

Akşin, S. (2010). *İstanbul hükümetleri ve Millî Mücadele*. Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

Atatürk, K. (1973). *Nutuk*. Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü.

Atatürk, M. K. (1973). *Nutuk: Cilt III: Vesikalar*. Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, Millî Eğitim Basımevi.

Atatürk, M. K. (1997). *Atatürk'ün söylev ve demeçleri*. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi.

Atatürk, M. K. (2024). *Atatürk'ün söylev ve demeçleri* (Y. Özgen, Ed.; 1906–1921). Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi.

Bardakçı, M. (2006). *Şahbaba: Osmanoğulları'nın son hükümdarı VI. Mehmed Vahideddin'in hayatı, hatıraları ve özel mektupları*. İnkılâp Kitabevi.

Baytok, T. (2007). *İngiliz belgeleriyle Sevr'den Lozan'a*. Doğan Kitap.

Berkes, N. (2002). *Türkiye'de çağdaşlaşma* (A. Kuyaş, Ed.). Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

British General Staff. (1920/1963). General Staff memorandum on the situation in Turkey, March 15, 1920 (No. 23). In R. Butler & J. P. T. Bury (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. XIII (pp. 26–37)*. Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Calthorpe, A. (1919/1952). Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon, August 1, 1919 (No. 472). In E. L. Woodward & R. Butler (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. IV: 1919* (pp. 712–714). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Çelik, R. (2016, Güz). İngiliz korumasında Sultan Vahideddin'in sürgün seyahatleri. *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, *16*(33), 183–209.

de Robeck, J. (1919a/1952). Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, September 17, 1919 (No. 512). In E. L. Woodward & R. Butler (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. IV: 1919* (p. 762). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

de Robeck, J. (1919b/1952). Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, September 17, 1919 (No. 513). In E. L. Woodward & R. Butler (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. IV: 1919* (pp. 763–765). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

de Robeck, J. (1920a/1963). Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, July 17, 1920 (No. 99). In R. Butler & J. P. T. Bury (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. XIII* (pp. 101–103). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

de Robeck, J. (1920b/1963). Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, October 4, 1920 (No. 150). In R. Butler & J. P. T. Bury (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. XIII* (pp. 154–155). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

de Robeck, J. (1920c/1963). Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, October 15, 1920 (No. 155). In R. Butler & J. P. T. Bury (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. XIII* (p. 159). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Dönmez, C. (1999). *Millî Mücadele'ye karşı bir cemiyet: İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti*. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi.

Elmacı, M. E. (2025). Sivas Kongresi'nden Damat Ferit Paşa'nın İstifasına Kadar İstanbul Basınında Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve Milli Mücadele (Eylül 1919). *Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi*, *12*(1), 465-505. https://doi.org/10.46868/atdd.2025.870

Endacott, J. L., & Brooks, S. (2013). An updated theoretical and practical model for promoting historical empathy. *Social Studies Research and Practice, 8*(1), 41–58.

Erdoğan, A. (2024, Aralık). Samsun'a İngiliz askeri çıkarılması ve Mustafa Kemal Paşa'nın askerlikten azledilmesi. *Nevşehir Hacı Bektaş Veli Üniversitesi SBE Dergisi*, *14*(4), 2124–2140.

Gazi Mustafa Kemal. (2015). *Nutuk*. Kaynak Yayınları.

Gökbilgin, M. T. (1959). *Millî Mücadele başlarken: Mondros Mütarekesi'nden Sivas Kongresi'ne*. Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

Güçer, D. (2024). Millî Mücadele döneminde Türk-İngiliz propaganda çalışmaları. *Savunma ve Güvenlik Araştırmaları Dergisi*, *1*(1), 21–48.

Gürkan, H. (2013). *Atatürk'ün Söylev'i (Nutuk) üzerine bir bibliyografya denemesi*. Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi, 13(27), 123–136.

Güven, E. (2019). İngiliz Basınında Mustafa Kemal Atatürk İmgesi: 1919-1923 Yılları Arası Daily Mail Gazetesi'ne Bir Bakış. *Kastamonu İletişim Araştırmaları Dergisi*, (3), 20-33.

Jaeschke, G. (2001). *Kurtuluş Savaşı ile ilgili İngiliz belgeleri* (Çev. C. Köprülü). Cumhuriyet.

Karabekir, K. (1951). *Istiklâl harbimizin esaslari*. Sinan.

Karabekir, K. (1951). *İstiklal Harbimizin esasları: Yanlış bilgi felaket kaynağıdır*. Sinan Matbaası ve Neşriyat Evi.

Karabekir, K. (2011). *Birinci Dünya Savaşı anıları* (Ed. Z. Öktem). Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

Karn, S. (2023). Historical empathy: A cognitive-affective theory for history education in Canada. *Canadian Journal of Education/Revue canadienne de l'éducation, 46(*1), 80–110.

Kıbıl, M. (2019). İngiliz belgelerinde Millî Mücadele ve Vahdettin. İçinde K. Ulusoy (Ed.), *3rd International Congress of Eurasian Social Sciences: Bildiri tam metinleri kongre e-kitabı* (pp. 1159–1188).

Köylü, M. (2023). Sultan Vahdettin's policy towards England after the Mudros Armistice. *Vakanüvis - Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, *8*(Special Issue), 2951–2967.

Küçük, C. (1993). Damad Ferid Paşa. İçinde *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (pp. 436–439). Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı.

Nur, R. (1967). *Hayat ve hatıratım*. Altındağ Yayınevi.

Okur, M. (2010). İngiliz belgelerine göre Sultan Vahdettin-İngiliz Yüksek Komiseri Amiral Robeck görüşmesi. *Atatürk Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Dergisi*, *3*(3), 129–149.

Özakman, T. (1997). *Vahidettin, M. Kemal ve Millî Mücadele: Yalanlar, yanlışlar, yutturmacalar*. Bilgi Yayınevi.

Özcan, O. (2023, Bahar). Millî Mücadele döneminde Büyük Britanya Harp Dairesi'nin "Türkiye'de Durum, 15 Mart 1920" isimli istihbarat raporu'nun değerlendirmesi (İstihbarat kısmı). *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, *23*(46), 187–237.

Rumbold, H. (1921/1970). Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Earl Curzon, January 20, 1921 (No. 14, tel. no. 43). In W. N. Medlicott et al. (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. XVII: Greece and Turkey, January 1, 1921–September 2, 1922* (pp. 21–24). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Rumbold, H. (1922a/1972). Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, September 4, 1922 (No. 3, tel. no. 374). In W. N. Medlicott et al. (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. XVIII: Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922–July 24, 1923* (pp. 2–3). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Rumbold, H. (1922b/1972). Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, September 4, 1922 (No. 6, tel. no. 378). In W. N. Medlicott et al. (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. XVIII: Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922–July 24, 1923* (p. 6). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Rumbold, H. (1922c/1972). Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, September 7, 1922 (No. 11, tel. no. 390). In W. N. Medlicott et al. (Eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939: First series, Vol. XVIII: Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922–July 24, 1923* (pp. 12–13). Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Semiz, O., & Aslan, B. (2019, Eylül). Damat Ferit Paşa hükümetleri tarafından Millî Mücadele aleyhinde yapılan İttihatçılık ve Bolşeviklik propagandasının Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisindeki yansımaları. *Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi*, (66), 693–712.

Sonyel, S. R. (2007). *Gizli belgelerde Mustafa Kemal, Vahdettin ve Kurtuluş Savaşı*. Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi.

Şimşir, B. N. (Ed.). (2006). *İngiliz belgelerinde Atatürk, 1919–1938*. Türk Tarih Kurumu.

Tunaya, T. Z. (2002). *Türkiye'de siyasal gelişmeler, 1876–1938: Cilt II. Mütareke, Cumhuriyet ve Atatürk dönemi*. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Tunaya, T. Z. (2007). *Devrim hareketleri içinde Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük*. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. (1960). *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi: Devre I, İçtima Senesi III, Cilt 24*. TBMM Matbaası. (Original proceedings published 1922).

Türkmen, Z. (2001). *Mütareke döneminde ordunun durumu ve yeniden yapılanması, 1918–1920*. Türk Tarih Kurumu.

Yenen, A. (2018). Elusive forces in illusive eyes: British officialdom's perception of the Anatolian resistance movement. *Middle Eastern Studies*, *54*(5), 788–810.

Yılmaz, E. (2020, Yaz). İngiliz basınında Millî Mücadele'nin hazırlık aşaması ve Mustafa Kemal algısı (1919–1920). *Belgi Dergisi*, *2*(20), 2265–2291.